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Abstract
This paper models the optimal search strategies of the unemployed
across space to characterize local labor markets. Our methodology al-
lows for linkages between numerous areas, while preserving tractability.
We estimate that labor markets are quite local, as the attractiveness
of jobs to applicants sharply decays with distance. Also, workers are
discouraged from searching in areas with strong job competition from
other jobseekers. However, as labor markets overlap, a local stimulus or
transport improvements have modest eﬀects on local outcomes, because
∗Mailing addresses: Alan Manning, Centre for Economic Performance, London School of
Economics, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE. Barbara Petrongolo, School of Economics
and Finance, Queen Mary University, Mile End Road, London E1 4NS. Email addresses:
a.manning@lse.ac.uk; b.petrongolo@qmul.ac.uk. We wish to thank Stéphane Bonhomme,
Gilles Duranton, Pat Kline and seminar participants at the London School of Economics,
Paris School of Economics, CREST (Paris), the University of Toulouse, the University of
Essex, IRVAPP (Trento), the NBER Summer Institute and the CEPR-ESSLE Conference
for helpful comments. We also thank Timothée Carayol for excellent research assistance
and the ESRC for funding this research through the Centre for Economic Performance at
the LSE.
1
ripple eﬀects in job applications dilute their impact across a series of
overlapping markets.
Keywords: job search; local labor markets; place-based policies; rip-
ple eﬀects.
JEL classification: J61; J63; J64; R12.
In recent years there has been a resurgence of interest in the consequences
of localization of economic activity for workers’ welfare (Moretti, 2011) and in
policies aimed to improve labor market outcomes in disadvantaged areas (see
Glaeser and Gottlieb, 2008, for a survey, and recent work by Busso, Gregory
and Kline, 2013). In the US, federal, state and local governments combined
spend nearly $50 billion per year on local development policies. The returns
to these policies depend crucially on the eﬀective size of local labor markets.
If labor markets are very local, an eﬀective intervention needs to be targeted
to the disadvantaged areas themselves and more distant interventions will
not benefit the target group. But if labor markets are not as local, targeted
intervention is ineﬀective as it may simply benefit workers from other, more
advantaged areas. A broader question concerns the incidence of local shocks to
labor demand and their impact on labor mobility and labor market equilibrium
(see among others Blanchard and Katz, 1992, Bound and Holzer, 2000, and
Notowidigdo, 2013).1 In addressing these and related questions, the size of
local labor markets is important in so far as it helps to define appropriate
treatment and control areas for the evaluation of local policies and shocks.
Most research on the topic relies on divisions of geographical space into
a relatively small number of non-overlapping areas, which are either purely
administrative units (e.g. states or counties in the US), or are intended to
be self-contained labor markets (examples would be the BEA’s 179 Economic
Areas and the 720 Commuting Zones for the US, or the 320 Travel to Work
Areas for the UK). These classifications are very valuable for understanding
1Another related issue is the spatial mismatch hypothesis (Kain, 1968), suggesting that
the unemployment rate of blacks in the inner city was so high because many jobs had moved
to the suburbs and these jobs were no longer in the local labor market of those living in the
city (see also Hellerstein, Neumark and McInerney, 2008, and Boustan and Margo, 2009,
and Zenou, 2013, for recent studies).
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spatial diﬀerences in economic outcomes, but suﬀer from important limitations
when it comes to research into local labor markets. First, the cost of distance
within such areas is implicitly assumed to be zero. Because people commute
large distances to work in the centre of big cities, large metropolitan areas are
generally classified as single labor markets. But those who live in the northern
suburbs might not think of the southern suburbs as part of their labor market.
Second, the non-overlapping nature of labor markets constructed in this way
causes inevitable discontinuities around the boundaries. Someone living just
inside a large metropolitan area would be classified as living in a large labor
market, while someone living just across the border would be classified as
living in a modestly-sized labor market. However, these individuals live in
essentially the same labor market.
In reality, the economy cannot be divided into non-overlapping segments,
and there is always some commuting across borders (see, for example, Monte,
Redding and Rossi-Hansberg, 2015; Amior and Manning, 2015). Typically,
the labor market for one individual at one location overlaps with that for
a second individual at a diﬀerent but not too distant location, whose labor
market then overlaps with that for a third individual, whose labor market
may not overlap at all with that of the first individual. The aim of this paper
is to develop a model of local labor markets that takes into account overlaps
and associated interdependencies, and to derive implications for the evaluation
of local policies.
We argue that a structural model is necessary to understand the anatomy
of local spillovers and to evaluate the impact of local intervention, and pro-
pose a job search model that allows for linkages across a large number of small
areas. Jobseekers decide whether to apply to job vacancies at diﬀerent lo-
cations, based on the probability of an application being successful, in turn
depending on how many other jobseekers are applying to these jobs, and on
the utility enjoyed on the job, which depends on the distance to it and the
wage paid. Linkages across areas arise because the number of applicants to
jobs in a given area is likely to be influenced, even if only very slightly, by
unemployment and vacancies in all other areas, as they are ultimately linked
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through a series of overlapping markets. We relate job matches in a ward to
the number of applications received by local vacancies, as predicted by our job
search model, taking as given the distribution of unemployment and vacancies.
We estimate the model parameters by minimizing the distance between the
model prediction and the observed vacancy filling rate.
In our empirical analysis we use unemployment and vacancy data on 8850
Census wards in England and Wales, and combine these with micro data on
wages and the use of transport modes, which allow us to model commuting
costs between any two wards in the economy. Our estimates show evidence
of high costs of distance. For example, the probability of a random job 5km
distant being preferred to random local job is only 19 percent. We find that
workers are discouraged from applying to jobs in areas where they expect
relatively strong competition from other jobseekers, and the hypothesis of
constant returns in search markets is not rejected, implying that larger scale
markets do not systematically oﬀer more eﬃcient matching of workers to jobs.
The estimated model predicts commuting patterns across UK wards which
replicate very accurately actual commuting patterns, even though commuting
data are not used for estimation.
The paper makes a number of contributions. First, on a methodological
level, our proposed model allows interdependencies across a very large number
of areas, while preserving tractability in analysis and estimation. Despite the
fact that workers in any of 8850 wards may apply to jobs in any of 8850
locations — with over 78 million combinations of origin and destination wards
— and the decision of each worker is influenced by the search strategies of other
workers, we show that the equilibrium allocation of applications can be solved
for using an eﬃcient contraction mapping.
Second, we provide microfoundations for the eﬀective size of local labor
markets. We characterize the size of local labor markets based on our estimate
for the cost of distance, as this is the main determinant of the set of jobs that
an unemployed worker, currently in a particular location, is willing to apply
for. The cost of distance is identified as the rate of decline of job applications
with distance from the applicant’s location, and its estimate embodies both the
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actual time and cost of travelling and the extent to which the attractiveness
of jobs varies within areas. Intuitively, workers are prepared to travel longer
distances when they expect wider variation in jobs’ attractiveness within areas,
as this makes it easier to find a distant job that provides higher utility than a
local job.
Third, we provide a deeper understanding of the likely impact of place-
based policies and how they should be evaluated. The observation that com-
mutes are generally short or, equivalently, that our estimated cost of distance
is relatively high, may suggest that local intervention would have heaviliy con-
centrated eﬀects on target areas. We show that this argument is deceptive
if labor markets are overlapping, an insight for which structural modelling is
critical. Even though the labor market for an individual worker may be quite
local, a local shock sends a ripple eﬀect through surrounding areas, diﬀusing
its impact over a much wider area than the typical commute. The extent of
the ripple eﬀect may be limited by “firebreaks”, i.e. natural or institutional
borders across which few workers commute.2 Ripple eﬀects have important
implications for the evaluation of place-based policies, as defining small treat-
ment areas around the shock location risks missing most of the impact and
possibly contaminating control areas. We suggest the treatment area should
be considerably larger than the median commute, although a test based on a
large treatment area, across which impact is highly diluted, may lack statis-
tical power, unless the scale of the shock is commensurate to its (relatively
large) size. In summary, ripple eﬀects imply that typical evaluations of place-
based policies may either yield biased estimates of the eﬀects of interest or be
under-powered.
The plan of the paper is as follows. The next Section describes the data
sets used. Section 3 proposes a model of job search across space. The model
incorporates interdependencies across a large number of small areas and illus-
2Statistical authorities attempt to find such firebreaks when defining local labor markets,
as the criterion typically used is based on limited cross-border commutes, relative to within-
border commutes. Indeed our model provides a framework justifying the criterion used
to define local units. Nonetheless, it is important to recognize that there is considerable
cross-border commuting across available measures of commuting zones.
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trates that the size of labor markets can be inferred from the optimal search
strategies of the unemployed. Section 4 reports our main estimates and com-
pares the model’s predictions to actual commuting patterns. Section 5 uses
the model estimates to map the simulated impact of place-based policies on
the spatial distribution of the unemployment outflow. Section 6 concludes.
I Data and descriptive statistics
The geographic units used in this paper are Census Area Statistics 2003 Wards
for England and Wales. There are 8850 CAS wards in England and Wales,
with an average population of about 5900.
We use data on several labor market indicators at the ward level, drawn
from various sources. Data on unemployment (the “claimant count”) and va-
cancies are from the UK Public Employment Service (PES). The series used
are produced by the Department for Work and Pensions and available through
NOMIS (nomisweb.co.uk). The UK PES is structured as a network of govern-
ment funded employment agencies (Jobcentres), whereby each town or neigh-
borhood within a city has at least one Jobcentre. Jobcentre services are free
of charge both to jobseekers and employers. To be entitled to receive welfare
payments, unemployed benefit claimants are required to register at a Jobcen-
tre, and sign-on every two weeks. The UK PES is much more widely used
than its US equivalent (see Manning, 2003, Table 10.5, and OECD, 2000).
Employers wishing to advertise job vacancies submit a form with detailed
job specifications to a centralized service called Employer Direct. Each vacancy
is assigned to the employer’s local Jobcentre, and has a dedicated recruitment
adviser, who can assist with the recruitment process. Regardless of the Jobcen-
tre in charge, the ward for each vacancy is defined using the full postcode of the
job location. Vacancies are advertised on the centralized employment website
https://jobsearch.direct.gov.uk; through the Jobcentre phone service; and on
the Jobcentre network, which can be accessed at Jobcentre oﬃces around the
country. Jobseekers can sample job openings via one or more of these methods,
using various search criteria (sector, occupation, working hours, distance from
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a given postcode etc.). The detailed geographic information on both claimant
unemployment and job vacancies recorded at Jobcentres makes them a unique
data source for studying job matching patterns at the very local level. The
series run monthly from April 2004 onwards. However, we restrict our sample
period to April 2004-April 2006, because changes introduced in May 2006 to
vacancy handling procedures make later vacancy series less suitable for our
purposes.3
As not all jobseekers are claimant unemployed and not all vacancies are
advertised through the PES, our data cannot cover the entire job matching
activity in the economy. Appendix A provides a more detailed discussion of
data coverage, and shows that our data capture an important section of both
supply and demand of the job search process in the UK, especially for low-
skilled workers and jobs. But imperfect coverage would be problematic if the
portion of the job search process covered by our data varies systematically
across areas, something on which unfortunately we have no information. As a
check against the possibility of biases, we assess the power of our job search
model in explaining commuting patterns across wards using a representative
sample of UK employees, independently of how they searched for jobs.
In the data presented below and all estimated specifications, we obtain the
vacancy and unemployment outflows as diﬀerences between the correspond-
ing inflows and the monthly variations in the stocks. Due to measurement
error, for about 0.5 percent of observations the vacancy outflow implied by
the stock-flow accounting identity is negative, and we drop the correspond-
ing observations. Table A1 in the Appendix presents descriptive statistics on
unemployment and vacancy stocks and flows from May 2004-April 2006, a
period of historically low and stable unemployment, and Table A2 shows pair-
3Prior to May 2006, vacancies notified to Jobcentres were followed up with the employer
until they were filled, and the number of vacancies filled at a Jobcentre was used as one of the
main indicators of its performance. From May 2006, the Jobcentre performance evaluation
is no longer based on vacancies being filled, thus vacancies notified to Jobcentres are not
followed-up, and have an ex-ante closure date agreed with the employer, upon which they
are automatically withdrawn. This systematically understates the stock of unfilled vacancies
from May 2006 onwards.
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wise correlations.4 Wards have on average 106 unemployed and 92 vacancies.
The average vacancy outflow rate is about one third. Most of the variation in
unemployment and vacancies is across, rather than within, wards, reflecting
wide variation in wards’ size, while the unemployment-to-vacancy (U-V) ratio
varies widely across both space and time. Figure A1 shows spatial variation
in the U-V ratio for a representative month in our sample, February 2005.
Diﬀerent wards are shaded according to the quartile of the corresponding U-V
ratios, with darker shades representing higher quartiles. There is no obvious
pattern emerging from this map — rather we observe a patchwork of very dif-
ferent labor market outcomes across quite small areas, and there are no large
regions in which, say, all high-unemployment wards are clustered together.
Additional data used are ward-level wages and commuting flows across
wards. Wage data are drawn from two sources. First, we construct a proxy of
ward-level wages by combining data on the industry structure of employment
at the ward level with industry-level earnings, exploiting the local variation
in the composition of employment and systematic inter-industry wage diﬀer-
entials to predict ward-level wages. The industry composition of wards is
obtained from the Business Register and Employment Survey (BRES) for the
period 2004-2006, and is measured at the 4-digit level, and hourly earnings
are obtained from the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE) for the
same period.5 The resulting ward-level wage measure is given by
c =X

 (1)
where  denotes the share of industry  in employment of ward , and 
denotes industry-specific median earnings. The ward-level average of c is
about 9£ per hour, in 2004 £. In our estimated model, we include this wage
4Unemployment and vacancy measures are “time aggregated”, obtained as the sum of
the stock measured at the end of the previous month, plus the monthly inflow (see Berman,
1997). By using lagged stocks, we lose the initial month in the sample period.
5The BRES is the oﬃcial, plant-level, source of employee estimates by detailed geography
and industry. The ASHE is an employer-based survey, covering a 1% random sample of
employees in the UK.
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measure among the components of the utility of working in a given ward.
Second, we use data on actual earnings available in ASHE. However, the
number of wage observations per ward is small. The median cell size is 40,
but 30 percent of wards have 20 wage observations or less, giving a very noisy
measure of ward-level wages. In order to avoid measurement error biases due
to small cell size, we do not use actual wages on the righ-hand side of our
estimated models. However, we use actual wages to test the model prediction
that wages should, ceteris paribus, be negatively aﬀected by the expected
number of applicants.
Data on commuting flows are obtained from the restricted access version
of ASHE, which contains information on postcode of work and postcode of
residence of employees, and we assign postcodes to wards to characterize com-
muting patterns across wards. Nearly half of employees in England and Wales
have commutes shorter than 6 km, and two thirds have commutes shorter
than 10 km. We will compare the distribution of actual commutes to the
distribution of commutes predicted by our model estimates.
II The job search model
This Section builds an estimable model of job search behavior across space.
Absent data on job applications, a structural model is necessary to understand
the anatomy of local spillovers and to evaluate the impact of local intervention.
Our approach develops in four steps. We first model the job search behavior
of individuals, directing their applications to vacancies in any area that oﬀer
the highest expected utility. Second, we specify expected utility as the product
of the utility the worker would enjoy on the job − which depends on the wage
earned and commuting costs − and the probability that her application is
successful − which depends on the number of applicants and, hence, the job
search behavior of others. Third, we characterize a fixed point in the mapping
across job applications, so that the spatial distribution of job applications is
the best response to itself. Finally we relate job matches in a ward to the
number of applications received by local vacancies, as predicted by the model.
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This is the relationship that we bring to the data in Section III.
A The job application process
There are  unemployed workers and  vacancies in each area  of the
economy. Each worker decides which of the existing vacancies to apply for,
and applications are simultaneous, in the non-sequential search tradition of
Burdett and Judd (1983). Assume that the expected utility for an unemployed
worker in area  applying to a vacancy in area  can be written as Ω
where Ω depends on the probability that the application is successful and
the attractiveness of working in  for a resident of  (specified in detail later),
and  is an idiosyncratic utility component, which is assumed to be i.i.d.
across workers and vacancies. Such idiosyncratic component may capture wage
variation around the area mean, non-monetary components to utility, or any
individual-specific preferences about living in  and working in .
Workers are assumed to have a cost function for sending  applications of
the form:
() = 
1 + 
1+
Under the assumption that the probability of more than one application being
successful is infinitesimal,6 the net expected utility from job search can be
6The assumption that the probability of more than one application being successful is
infinitesimal plays an important role. If this assumption is not met, vacancies cannot be
ranked by the expected utility oﬀered, and this substantially complicates the worker decision
problem. To see this more formally, let’s denote the expected utility from a vacancy as 
where  is the probability of an application being successful and  is the utility enjoyed
if successful. Suppose that jobs can be ordered in terms of utility, i.e. 1  2  
Furthermore, assume that jobs that oﬀer a higher utility have a lower probability of success,
so that 1  2   In this case a worker only accepts job  if no job applications to
lower jobs have been successful. The expected utility from applying to a set of jobs is thusP
Π−1=1(1 − )  This leads to a decision rule in which the marginal benefit of
applying to vacancy  can be written as  ( −) (1−)  where  is the probability of
getting a better job than  and  is the expected utility from jobs worse than , conditional
on a better job not being obtained. The eﬀect of other applications on the decision to apply
to vacancy  is no longer limited to their eﬀect on marginal costs. But the diﬀerence between
this specifciation of marginal benefit and the one we use is small if  and  are small.
Chade and Smith (2006) provide a more complete analysis of optimal decision rules in this
case.
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expressed as: P

Ω − 
1 + 
ÃP


!1+

where  is a binary variable taking the value 1 if a worker applies to vacancy
 in area  and zero otherwise. Mazimization of expected utility implies that
a worker applies to all vacancies for which the expected utility of doing so is
higher or equal to the marginal cost  0() :7
Ω ≥ 
µP


¶
=  (2)
If we assume that  is Pareto distributed with exponent , the probability that
a worker in  applies to a vacancy in  can be written as:
Pr (Ω ≥  ) =
µ Ω

¶

where  denotes the total number of applications sent by a worker in . The
number of expected applications sent from each worker in  to vacancies in ,
denoted by , is thus given by:
 = 
µ Ω

¶
 (3)
7In the interests of simplicity we do not impose the number of applications to be an
integer. Imposing this would yield a first-order condition for the optimal number of ap-
plications in the form of an inequality, which would be much harder to treat analytically.
In addition, there may be mixed strategy equilibria, in which case the average number of
applications could be a non-integer. One could reinterpret the number of applications in
this model as a decision about their (continuous) search eﬀort, combined with a decision
about the distribution of such eﬀort across vacancies at diﬀerent locations. This mechanism
would deliver a specification relating the vacancy outflow rate in an area to the number of
applicants, where the number of applicants is re-interpreted as the rate at which job seekers
apply to vacancies. This formulation is more similar to that used in the sequential search
literature, e.g. Pissarides (2000).
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Summing the  terms across all possible destination areas  yields:
 =
X


µ Ω

¶

which can be solved for  :
 =
Ã
−X

Ω
!
 (4)
where  = 1(1 + ) The parameter  (or - equivalently - its transforma-
tion ) is related to the returns to scale in the matching function. The issue
of constant versus increasing returns is a recurrent question in the matching
literature, as increasing returns lead to the possibility of multiple equilibria
(Diamond, 1982). If  = 0 ( = 1), the marginal cost of an application is
constant and a worker applies to a vacancy if the expected utility of doing
so is above this marginal cost. In this case doubling the number of vacancies
leads to a doubling in the number of applications each worker makes. The
average number of applicants per vacancy remains unchanged, and so does
the probability of filling each vacancy. The total number of matches also dou-
bles, thus there are constant returns to scale to vacancies alone. But if one
doubles both vacancies and the number of unemployed workers, the number
of applications will rise four-fold, as both the applications per worker and the
number of workers double. This implies increasing returns to scale.
At the other extreme, consider  = ∞ ( = 0). In this scenario each
worker has a fixed number of applications to make, and will direct them to
vacancies that oﬀer the highest expected utility. A doubling of vacancies and
unemployment leads to a doubling of applications, as applications per worker
are unchanged and the number of workers has doubled. Hence applications
per vacancy are unaltered, the probability of filling a vacancy is unaltered,
and the total number of matches will double. This implies constant returns to
scale.
Our set-up makes it harder to rationalize the possibility of decreasing re-
turns, which would require some extra form of congestion in the model. How-
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ever, our model is consistent with decreasing returns to vacancies and unem-
ployment in individual areas, as doubling vacancies and unemployment in a
particular area would result in a lower probability of filling jobs in that area
due to spillovers across neighboring areas.
Combining (3) and (4) gives a solution for the number of applications made
by workers in  to vacancies in :
 = −Ω
ÃX
0
0Ω0
!−1
 (5)
The intuition behind (5) is that the number of applications sent from area 
to area  depends on job opportunities in area  () and the expected utility
from those jobs (Ω). The term in brackets can be interpreted as a weighted
average of vacancies across the whole economy, where weights are given by the
expected utility oﬀered to residents of . This term captures the “eﬀective”
size of the economy, and would simply work as a normalization in the case of
constant returns ( = 0). When  = 0, (5) has clear similarities with a logit
model.
The number of applications received by vacancies in  is given by the sum
of applications that workers in any area  send to area . Thus the ratio of
applications per vacancy in , denoted by , is given by
 =
P

 = 
−X

Ω
ÃX
0
0Ω0
!−1
 (6)
This is an expression for market tightness in area  and states that the ex-
pected number of applications per job in  depends on the distribution of the
unemployed across all possible origin areas  () and the expected utility
they would enjoy from jobs in  (Ω).
To make equation (6) operational, we assume that expected utility can be
expressed as:
Ω =  () (7)
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where  () is the probability of an application being successful, assumed to
depend negatively on the number of applicants,  is the wage oﬀered by jobs
in area , and  represents the intrinsic attractiveness of a job in area  for
a resident of , which is primarily a function of distance.
Substituting (7) into (8) leads to the key result of our spatial job search
model:
 =
P

 = 
−X

 ( () )
"X
0
0 ( (0) 00)
#−1

(8)
Expression (8) captures all interdependencies across areas. According to
(8), the number of applications to jobs in  is likely to be influenced (even if
only very slightly) by unemployment and vacancies in all other areas, because
they are ultimately linked through a series of overlapping labor markets. With
8,850 wards, this expression represents a system of 8,850 equations in 8,850
unknowns. But Appendix B shows that, under reasonable conditions, (8) is a
contraction mapping, which can be solved iteratively and eﬃciently to obtain
. This is the feature that allows us to estimate a model with a very large
number of areas.
It is helpful to highlight the relationship between our model of job search,
in which vacancies receive a number of applications and then, possibly, choose
one of them, and the more common modelling strategy based on a flow arrival
rate of job applicants, in which the first acceptable candidate is chosen (e.g.
Pissarides, 2000). In our model one could reinterpret the number of appli-
cations as a decision about the rate at which one applies for jobs, combined
with a decision about the distribution of these applications over vacancies at
diﬀerent locations. This mechanism would also lead to a specification relating
the vacancy outflow rate to the number of applicants, in which the number of
applicants is re-interpreted as the rate at which job applicants apply to the
firm.
Our approach also has similarities to the way in which markets for diﬀeren-
tiated goods are represented in industrial organization models, using contrac-
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tion mappings to characterize equilibrium (see Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes,
1995). One can think of a product as being a job in a particular area. Com-
pared to most IO applications, we have strong a priori information on which of
these products are the closest substitutes — those closer in space — which allows
us to reduce the dimensionality of product heterogeneity. Consumers (work-
ers in our applications) are also diﬀerentiated by space, and one can think of
information on unemployment and vacancies as being information on the dis-
tribution of diﬀerent consumer and product types. Job applications play the
role of prices, in the sense that more applications discourage consumers from
purchasing a product of a particular type and encourage them to divert their
demand to other products. Our outcome variable, the number of matches,
represents the market outcome in a quantity space. The equation we estimate
is essentially a reduced-form equation for the quantity traded as a function
of the demand and supply fundamentals, and the demand function can be
identified under the assumption of exogenously fixed supply of vacancies.
B Endogenous Wages
The discussion so far has treated wages in an area as exogenous, but in reality
wages are likely to respond, among other factors, to the ease of filling vacancies.
We next endogenize wages, by assuming that they are set to maximize the
expected profits from a vacancy, as given by:
Π = ( − )Ψ ( ( )) 
where  denotes productivity, potentially varying by area, Ψ () denotes the
probability of filling a vacancy that receives  applications, and  ( ) is the
number of applications to a vacancy in area  paying wage  . We assume
Ψ () is increasing and concave in , and bounded between zero and one, with
() = Ψ () .
The first-order condition for wage setting can be written as:
 = ( − ) Ψ  (9)
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where Ψ is the elasticity of the probability of filling a vacancy with respect
to the number of applications and  is the elasticity of applications with
respect to the oﬀered wage. To derive   note that, using (3), applications
per job in area  must solve:
 =
X


µ()

¶
 (10)
where  is exogenous to the individual firm in . Using (10):
 = 
1−  =

1− (Ψ − 1)  (11)
where the second equality follows from  = (Ψ−1). Substituting (11) into
(9) and re-arranging yields:
 = 
1 + Ψ () (12)
This result implies that the wage oﬀered in an area is increasing in local
productivity, and is influenced by the number of applicants whenever this
aﬀects the elasticity of the probability of filling a job Ψ (). It is reasonable
to expect that Ψ () declines with  — and the functional form used below
does have this feature — implying that oﬀered wages decline with the expected
number of applicants. This can be thought of as the conventional relationship
between wages and labor market tightness. Substituting (12) into (8) gives
applications per job:
 = −
X


µ 
1 + Ψ
0 ()
¶ "X
0
0
µ 
1 + Ψ
0 (0)00
¶#−1

(13)
Both the exogenous and endogenous wage models will be estimated in Sec-
tion III. To make these models estimable we need to impose further structure
on their components, as discussed next.8
8As is typical in a search environment, decentralized equilibrium in our model is in
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C The Cost of Distance Function
The main determinant of the attractiveness of a job in  for someone living in
, , is the cost of commuting between  and . We model the cost of distance
between any two wards based on a framework of transport choice that origi-
nated in McFadden (1973) and is widely used in the transportation literature
(see, among others, Small, Winston and Yan, 2005). Consider an individual
living in  and working in , at distance , with a choice of transport mode
 = 1  (walking, bike, car or public transport in our application) for the
journey. The utility of using mode  can be written as:
 = e0 − e1 + 
where e1 denotes the cost of distance for mode  reflecting a combination of
time and monetary costs. For example, walking involves negligible monetary
costs but considerable time costs, while driving has higher monetary costs but
lower time costs. e0 measures the attractiveness of mode  for a journey of
distance zero, and  measures uncertainty about the time and monetary costs
involved. Under the assumption that  has an extreme value distribution,
the probability of choosing mode  is given by the logit model:
Pr ( = |  ) = 
0−1P
0 00−10

It can be shown that the expected utility for the choice of alternatives modes
of transport is represented by the inclusive value. This is given by:
 = ln
X
0
00−10
general ineﬃcient. When a firm creates a vacancy in a certain area, she makes it harder for
firms in the same area and other surrounding areas to fill their vacancies, as the number
of applications per vacancy falls, but she makes it easier for unemployed workers to receive
a job oﬀer. Therefore vacancy creation generates both negative and positive externalities,
whose relative size cannot be a priori determined, which are not internalized in wage setting.
In a spatial job search model, there are thus issues about the eﬃciency of the geographic
distribution of vacancies, as well as about their overall number.
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The parameters of the logit model can only be identified relative to some base
category, which we assume to be driving. This is the most common commuting
mode, used by a non-trivial proportion of people for journeys of all distances.
Having denoted driving by  = 1, the logit model can be rewritten as:
Pr ( = |  ) = 
0−1P
0 00−10  (14)
where 0 ≡ e0 − e01 and 1 ≡ e1 − e11.
This model is estimated on commuting data from the 2001 Census Special
Workplace Statistics, containing information on the number of people commut-
ing between any two wards and the mode of transport used. The regression
results, reported in Table A3, show that the marginal cost of distance is high-
est for walking, followed by cycling and, last, public transport and car. We
use these estimates to predict the inclusive value relative to driving, and take
the exponential to ensure non-negativity:
exp() ≡ c  =X
0
00−10 (15)
We include c  in the determination of the utility to apply for jobs at diﬀerent
locations:
 = c 0− (16)
where 0 is a constant term,  is the distance between  and , and 
measures the exponential rate of decay of the attractiveness of a given job
with distance, when the transport mode is driving.
In the empirical specifications (8) and (13), all  terms are raised to
power of . In fact,  is not well-identified in this model, and we simply aim
to identify ∗ ≡ . The reason why  and  play similar roles is that an
increase in the variance of the idiosyncratic component of utility — represented
by a rise in  — has observationally equivalent consequences on the probability
of applying for a job as a fall in the cost of distance. Intuitively, if idiosyncratic
characteristics of jobs vary widely within areas, workers are more likely to find
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a distant job that oﬀers higher utility than a local job, and thus are willing
to travel longer distances. A lower cost of distance would produce a similar
outcome. ∗ is thus identified as the rate of decline of job applications with
distance, and its estimate embodies both the actual time and monetary cost
of travelling, and the extent to which the attractiveness of jobs varies within
areas.
For estimation purposes, in both the logit model (14) and the job applica-
tion models (8) and (13) we measure distance between any two diﬀerent wards
 and  as the geographic distance between their centroids, implicitly assuming
that commutes start and end in the centroid of each ward. For within-ward
commutes, we use instead the average distance between two random points in
a circle:
 = 128
−15
45
05
where  measures the size of the ward in square km. Thus we are approx-
imating each ward with a circle of identical area, and each commute with the
average within-ward commute. To assess the goodness of these approxima-
tions we compute commuting distances across postcodes, which identify one
street or part of it, using information on postcode of residence and postcode of
work from ASHE. We then assign postcodes to wards and compute commuting
distances as described. The correlation between the two distance measures is
0.9995 overall and 0.9035 for commutes within 10 km. Figure A2 shows the
binned scatterplot (by 100-metre bins) of the postcode-based distance against
the ward-level distance, which virtually coincides with the 45 degree line ex-
cept at distances below 200 metres, which represent 1 in 10,000 observations
in ASHE.
D The Probability of Filling a Vacancy
We use an urn-ball framework to model the probability of filling a vacancy, in
which firms play the role of urns and applications the role of balls. Because
of a coordination failure, a random placing of the balls in the urns implies
that some urns will end up with more than one ball and some with none,
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with overcrowding in some jobs and no applications in others. Conditional on
receiving an application, a vacancy may still remain unfilled if one allows for
worker heterogeneity and the possibility that an applicant may not be suitable
for the job. Having denoted by  the probability of an individual applicant
being suitable for the job, the probability that a given vacancy is not filled by
any applicant is (1−) and the vacancy outflow rate is 1−(1−). For small
enough , (1 − ) ' exp(−). We further introduce a scale parameter ,
that aﬀects the level of job matches at given applications. This can be thought
of the probability that a match is made, conditional on receiving at least
one acceptable application, and is related to overall matching eﬀectiveness.
Combining these elements, the probability of filling a vacancy can be written
as:
Ψ(˜) = 
³
1− −˜
´
 (17)
where ˜ ≡  denotes the expected number of acceptable applicants.
E Combining Model Elements
Expressions (17) and (16) can be combined with (8) to derive an estimable job
application model for the exogenous wage case. As a wage proxy, we use the
predicted ward-level wage based on the local industry structure, c , defined
in (1):
˜1+ = ec  ³1− −˜´X

−∗c 
⎡
⎣X
0
0
Ã
1− −˜0
˜0
!c 0 −∗0c 0
⎤
⎦
−1

(18)
where e ≡ −0−1 bundles all constant terms that cannot be sepa-
rately identified. We introduce a further parameter  as an elasticity on the
wage term, allowing us to test for the explanatory power of wages on the allo-
cation of job applications rather than simply assume it as in (8), in which the
null hypothesis is  = 1.
For the endogenous wage model, we need a measure of ward-level pro-
ductivity . As there are no available data on productivity at such local
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level, we again use the local industry structure as a proxy, based on evidence
that high-productivity areas tend to specialize in high-productivity industries.
Specifically, we assume that  is isoelastic in c :
 = 0c 1  (19)
By combining (13), (17), (16) and (19) we obtain:
˜ = ˘c 1 −˜X

−∗c 
"X
0
0−˜0c 10 −∗0c 0
#−1

(20)
where ˘ ≡ −0−1−10 
Models (18) and (20) give mappings from unemployment and vacancies —
via job applications — to the vacancy outflow rate Ψ(˜) = (1 − −˜) The
mapping depends on all model parameters, whose interpretation is summarized
as follows:
• ∗ captures the rate of decline of job applications with distance and
encompasses both time and monetary costs of distance, as well as het-
erogeneity in job characteristics. For simplicity, we will refer to this as
“cost of distance”.
•  measures the returns to scale in the matching function.
•  (or 1) measures the impact of wages on applications.
•  controls job matches for given applicants, and thus captures matching
eﬀectiveness.
• e (or ˘) controls the general level of suitable applications.
•  measures the extent of heterogeneity in utility across jobs in an area.
The model is then estimated by non-linear least squares, choosing parame-
ters to minimize the diﬀerence between the observed vacancy outflow rate and
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the predicted rate: X

∙
 −Ψ(
e)¸2  (21)
where  denotes the number of vacancies filled in .9
III Results
A Main Estimates
This Section provides estimates of our structural model. For reasons of com-
puting capacity, we are unable to estimate the main regression equation (21)
on the whole sample period, and thus this is separately estimated for each
month from May 2004-April 2006. This, however, has the advantage that
each month’s estimate can be thought of as a draw from the data, providing a
measure of the standard error of our estimates based on their variation across
diﬀerent months, which we can then compare with standard errors produced
by the non-linear least squares procedure.
Table 1 reports time averages of the parameters of interest. The parameter
 was never well-identified. The estimates reported fix it at 1, and the model
fit was not sensitive to this normalizing assumption. Poor identification of 
can be traced to the fact that, unlike for other parameters,  is not linked to
a readily identifiable feature of the data, and is only identified by a functional
form assumption on Ψ( e).10 The Table also reports standard errors, obtained
9In estimation, we treat the spatial distribution of unemployment and vacancies as ex-
ogenous, as in most of the literature on the estimation of matching functions (see Petrongolo
and Pissarides, 2001, for a survey). This is consistent with evidence from the policy simula-
tion exercises described in Section IV, showing that the returns to job search — as measured
by the probability of leaving unemployment or filling a vacancy — are not very responsive to
local shocks. The direction of the implied biases from assuming exogenous unemployment
and vacancies is not ex-ante clear. Suppose that one location has a more eﬃcient matching
function. This leads to higher vacancy outflows and a lower stock of unemployment and
vacancies, with ambiguous eﬀects on the U-V ratio and the number of applicants per job.
On the other hand, if the unemployed and firms are mobile, such an area will attract work-
ers and firms, leading to both higher unemployment and vacancies, with again ambiguous
eﬀects on the U-V ratio.
10To see this, note that, if Ψ () were iso-elastic,  would not be identified at all.
22
with two alternative methods. The first measure (s.e.1) is obtained as the
standard deviation of the monthly parameter estimates. These are valid if the
underlying parameters are constant over time and there is no serial correlation
in the estimates, and Appendix C shows that the extent of serial correlation is
small and never significant. The second measure (s.e.2) reports the “sandwich”
standard error obtained from the non-linear least squares estimator, allowing
for possible heteroskedasticity and spatial correlation in the residuals, but
assuming that the covariance between residuals from areas more than 100km
apart is zero. Appendix C gives full detail on how sandwich standard errors
are obtained.11
Estimates reported in columns 1-3 of Table 1 refer to the exogenous wage
model. The estimate for ∗ representing the cost of distance, is positive and
highly significant, based on either standard error measure. A point estimate
of 0.22 implies a relatively strong decay of job applications with distance. To
see this, consider choice between two random jobs paying the same wage. Job
1 is local while job 2 is located further afield (1  2), and 1 and 2 denote
the respective idiosyncratic utility components. Despite the longer commute,
a worker may still prefer job 2 over job 1 if the associated idiosyncratic util-
ity component is high enough. From (7) and (16), job 2 is preferred to job
1 if 2−∗(2−1)c 2c 1  1. Under the assumption that 1 and 2 are
Pareto distributed, simple algebra shows that this happens with probability
1
2
−∗(2−1)c 2c 1. Assume, for instance, 1 = 1 and 2 = 5. With
∗ = 022, a worker would prefer the more distant job over the local one in
only 19 percent of cases. Our findings are in line with relatively high costs of
commuting detected by Bonhomme and Jolivet (2009), who exploit informa-
tion on job satisfaction from the ECHPS, and find that workers in Europe are
typically willing to forgo large fractions of their salaries to become satisfied
with their commuting distances or costs, ranging from 40 percent in France to
14 percent in Austria (though they do not report estimates for the UK). This
11See also Driscoll and Kraay (1998) for a discussion on how to obtain standard errors
corrected for heteroskedasticity, serial and/or spatial correlation in panel data with a large
number of geographic units.
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is also consistent with the finding of Krueger at al. (2008) that commuting
has a more detrimental impact on subjective well being than work itself.
The point estimate for  is negative, implying decreasing returns in match-
ing, although this is only significant based on s.e.1 in column 2. Our model
would require some extra form of congestion in order to deliver decreasing
returns in the matching function.12 The parameter  representing the role of
wages in the utility provided by jobs in an area, is significantly positive and not
significantly diﬀerent from one, in line with expression (7). The parameter 
which represents the probability of filling a vacancy when there is at least one
suitable applicant, is about 0.37 and highly significant. Finally the parametere controlling the number of expected suitable applicants, ˜, is close to 1 on
average and highly significant. At the sample means, the estimate of e implies
that there is (almost exactly) 1 suitable applicant per vacancy.
The next three columns in Table 1 report estimates for the endogenous
wage model, in which profit-maximizing wages are related to productivity via
the parameter 1. The main diﬀerence with respect to the exogenous wage
model estimates are a higher cost of distance (∗ = 036), and a virtually zero
estimate for , thus constant returns cannot be rejected on either standard
error measure.
As typically with structural models, it is not straightforward to visualize
the link between parameter estimates and specific data feature, and we devote
Appendix D to highlight such links and discuss identification. Specifically, we
estimate a reduced-form matching function in unemployment and vacancies
at various distances to describe local matching patterns in a transparent way.
As expected, the vacancy outflow rate in a ward rises with the unemployment
stock and falls with the vacancy stock, and these eﬀects gradually fade out
with distance from the local ward, and the hypothesis of constant returns to
12A potential source of decreasing returns would be transport congestion: the higher the
number of commuters from  to , the lower the corresponding utility Ω — other things equal
— due to transport congestion. Alternatively, one could allow the probability to fill a vacancy
to decrease with the size of the local vacancy pool, , for any given level of job applications
per vacancy, e, directly introducing decreasing returns to scale in the matching function.
As in most specifications we obtain estimates for  that are not significantly diﬀerent from
zero, we choose not to introduce further elements of search congestion into the model.
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scale in matching is not rejected. Following the approach of Gentzkow and
Shapiro (2014), we then provide a mapping from the data to the structural
parameters, by relating monthly variation in structural parameter estimates to
variation in reduced-form estimates. This exercize confirms the interpretation
of structural parameters given above. For example, months in which distant
unemployment and vacancies seem relatively less important in the reduced-
form model are months in which our estimated cost of distance is relatively
high. This exercize gives us confidence that the structural parameter estimates
obtained do reflect relevant features of the data.
B Alternative Specifications
In Table 2 we report estimates of alternative specifications of the job appli-
cation model for February 2005, and Table A4 in the Appendix reports the
corresponding average estimates for the whole sample period. The simple
criterion used for picking a reference month in Table 2 is that it should not
be December or a summer month, and that the parameter estimates for this
month should be relatively close to the sample averages, so as to make the
estimates of Table 2 well representative for the whole sample period. For rea-
sons of computing capacity, we could not estimate the endogenous wage model
with more than five parameters, and all specifications presented below refer to
the exogenous wage model.
Column 1 in Table 2 reports estimates for the base model for February 2005,
and indeed all estimates are very close to sample averages reported in columns
1-3 of Table 1. As constant returns to scale are not rejected, the specification
of column 2 imposes constant returns ( = 0) and shows estimates which are,
unsurprisingly, very close to the estimates of the unrestricted model in column
1.
We next consider whether job applications are a suﬃcient statistic for de-
scribing job matches, as our model would predict. To do this we test whether
the local U-V ratio has a significant explanatory power on local job matches,
once one controls for applications per job, modifying the expected outflow rate
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(21) to

µ

¶
= 
³
1− −˜−1(11)
´

where 11 denotes the U-V ratio within 1 km from the centroid of ward
, and job applications and the local U-V ratio are substitutes up to a para-
meter 1. Column 3 reports estimates of this specification, and shows a small
and non significant impact of 11, confirming the prediction that appli-
cations should be a suﬃcient statistics for variation in the vacancy outflow.
Importantly, we show in Appendix D.1 that, in a reduced-form vacancy out-
flow equation that does not control for applications, the local U-V ratio has a
positive and highly significant impact on the vacancy outflow, but the results
of column 3 show that this variable has no residual explanatory power once the
role of labor market tightness is captured by the number of job applications.
The other parameter estimates in column 3 remain close to those obtained on
the main specification of column 1, although the return to scale parameter is
now significantly negative.
We have so far assumed that labor markets only diﬀer in wages oﬀered
and distance to potential applicants, and failure to recognize job and worker
heterogeneity along other relevant dimensions could induce us to overstate the
cost of distance. For example, if very few workers in  apply to jobs in ,
our model would interpret that  and  are located too far apart to belong to
the same local labor market, but another reason may be that workers in  do
not have the right skills to perform jobs in . To control for worker and job
heterogeneity, we construct an index of mismatch between the skill composition
of each origin labor market and that of each destination labor market, based
on the occupational composition of claimants and job vacancies.13 We extract
data on claimants and job vacancies by ward and 1-digit occupation, and
construct the following index of occupation dissimilarity between origin area
13For the unemployed the occupation refers to the type of job sought.
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 and destination area  :
 =
8X
=1
¯¯¯¯
 −


¯¯¯¯

where the occupation categories considered are: (1) managers and profession-
als; (2) associate professionals and technical occupations; (3) administrative
and secretarial occupations; (4) skilled trades occupations; (5) personal ser-
vice occupations; (6) sales and customer service occupations; (7) process, plant
and machine operatives; (8) elementary occupations. We then introduce the
mismatch indicator as a penalty in the utility of commuting from  to :
 = (0−−2)c 
where 2 is an extra parameter to be identified. The results are reported in
column 4, where the estimate for 2 is positive, as expected, but very imprecise.
While the February 2005 point estimate, together with the sandwich standard
error, does not deliver a significant impact of mismatch, according to the
estimates based on the whole sample period and bootstrapped standard errors
(column 4 in Table A4) the impact of mismatch becomes significant at the 10
percent level. In either case, the estimate for the cost of distance is hardly
aﬀected by the inclusion of the mismatch term.
To conclude, we compare the relative merits of the job application model
proposed with a conventional matching function in vacancies and unemploy-
ment, by only including 11 as a regressor in place of job applicants ˜.
We express the expected outflow rate as

µ

¶
=  ¡1− −11¢ 
and report the corresponding  estimate in column 5. The fit of the equation is
substantially worse than that of the structural model, as shown by the residual
sums of squares. Thus the job application model performs better at explaining
the variation in job matching rates than a simple matching function in local
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unemployment and vacancies.
C Evidence from Wages
One of the predictions of endogenous wage setting is that wages oﬀered should,
ceteris paribus, decline with the expected number of job applicants, according
to result (12). We show evidence on this prediction using data on hourly
earnings from ASHE from 2003-2008. We estimate log wage regressions that
control for individual characteristics and the number of applicants per ward, as
predicted by the estimates of column 1 in Table 2, and ward-level productivity,
as predicted by the industry structure. Not all wards are represented in this
sample (8,752 out of 8,850), because there are no available wage observations
for 98 wards.
The results from log wage regressions are reported in Table 3. Both ap-
plications and productivity are ward-level averages, and standard errors are
clustered at the ward level. Column 1 regresses log hourly earnings on log
productivity and the (log) predicted number of job applications from the es-
timated structural model, averaged across all months. The coeﬃcient on the
productivity variable is positive and significant, as expected. However the co-
eﬃcient on applications is positive, while the model would predict a negative
eﬀect. The specification in column 1 omits individual characteristics that are
correlated with wages, and the specification of column 2 controls for a com-
plete set of age dummies, interacted with gender, and broad region dummies,
to account for the fact that wages in London are much higher than elsewhere.
The coeﬃcient on the number of applications is now negative and significantly
diﬀerent from zero (although quantitatively very small, and indeed smaller
than the structural model would predict). Column 3 also controls for 3-digit
occupation, and the coeﬃcient on the number of applications remains nega-
tive and significant, confirming that areas that are predicted to receive larger
numbers of applications have, all else equal, lower wages.
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D Predicted Commuting Flows
One of the main results obtained, and namely a relatively high cost of distance,
implies that job search is concentrated within fairly local areas, and the plau-
sibility of our estimates ultimately relies on their ability to predict external
evidence on actual job finding behavior. This subsection assesses the predic-
tive power of our estimated model by exploiting its predictions for commuting
patterns between any two wards.
Commutes from  to  are given by the number of applications that the
unemployed in  send to jobs in , times the probability that these are suc-
cessful:
( e) (22)
The distribution of predicted commutes can be obtained as the share of workers
who live in  and work in , for all possible pairs ( ) Given (22), this is equal
to
( e)P
0 0( e0)  (23)
Predictions are compared to actual commutes for all workers, as obtained
from administrative data in ASHE. Predicted and actual commuting may not
coincide if workers who accept a job in a ward tend to relocate, for example
to shorten their commute, or if jobseekers filling Jobcentre vacancies have
diﬀerent commuting patterns from jobseekers who find jobs via other channels.
However, external evidence on commuting behavior from the UK Labor Force
Survey (LFS) suggests that this is not a major concern. The LFS contains
information on commuting times for those in new jobs and those in continuing
jobs and, for those in new jobs, on how they obtained the job. Table A5 in
the Appendix presents evidence on the average length of commute for these
groups. The average commute for the category of workers we model — those
who have recently got a job through a Jobcentre — is the same as for the
overall employed population. As the characteristics of workers in diﬀerent cells
may diﬀer, and they may be related to commuting times, we also compare
diﬀerences in commuting times controlling for the method used to find the
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current job, age, gender, region and year (results not reported), and we find
no significant diﬀerence between commuting times of those who found jobs
via Jobcentres and those who are not on new jobs. This justifies comparisons
between the commutes predicted by our model with the commuting data for
the whole population.
To obtain actual commutes, we use we use information on postcode of
residence and postcode of work of employees in ASHE for 2003-2008. We
expand the sample period in ASHE relative to our original 2004-2006 sample
to reduce noise due to small cell size, as each cell is a combination of any two
origin and destination wards. We then group the obtained commuting flows by
1 km distance bins. Predicted commutes are computed using equation (23) and
the estimates of column 1 in Table 2, and again aggregated by 1 km distance
bins. Figure 1 plots the actual and predicted distributions of commutes, and
shows that our estimated model indeed replicates very acturately the observed
commuting behavior, and in particular the spike in the density of commutes
at very short distances. This suggests that our high estimated cost of distance
has clear empirical plausibility.
IV Evaluating Place-Based Policies
There is a large and growing literature on the evaluation of place-based poli-
cies, increasingly using modern evaluation methods and better research de-
signs (see Glaeser and Gottlieb, 2008, and Moretti, 2011, for recent surveys,
and Kline and Moretti, 2013, for a model of place-based policies with frictional
unemployment). A clear consensus on the impact of place-based policies is yet
to emerge,14 partly because of wide variation in the size of intervention, and
because a typical place-based policy combines several elements.
One of the advantages of structural models is that they can be used for ex
14Some studies (e.g. Hanson, 2009, Neumark and Kolko, 2010, for the US; Einiö and
Overman, 2016, for the UK; and Mayer, Meyneris and Py, 2015, for France) find little or no
eﬀects, or only displacement eﬀects, of place-based policies, while others do detect benefits
for local employment (e.g. Busso, Gregory and Kline, 2012, for the US; Duranton, Gobillon
and Overman, 2011, Criscuolo et al, 2012, for the UK).
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ante policy evaluation and this section illustrates our model’s prediction about
the impact of local policies. We consider two common types of intervention: an
increase in vacancies in a targeted area (possibly induced by local subsidies to
job creation); and an improvement in the transport infrastructure of targeted
areas, designed to make jobs more accessible. In both cases the intervention
considered is very “local”, being targeted on neighborhoods, and we later
discuss how predictions would diﬀer if one considered interventions over a
larger scale.
One limitation of our model for the evaluation of place-based policies comes
from its assumption of given vacancies and unemployment. In other words the
model cannot be used, for example, to assess the extent to which place-based
policies lead to vacancy creation in targeted areas or displace vacancies in
neighboring areas, or alter the residential decisions of workers (see Beaudry,
Green and Sand, 2012, and Rupert and Wasmer, 2012, for recent attempts to
combine search and residential mobility). However, our model can shed light on
the likely size of these responses. In particular, we show that the overlapping
structure of local labor markets largely dilutes the impact of local policies
across space, with limited impact on the local vacancy and unemployment
outflows. This result suggests that the returns to locating in a certain area
are not greatly aﬀected by the policy interventions considered.
A Local Labor Demand Stimulus
A recurrent question in the design of local policy is whether unemployment
may be alleviated in a depressed area using local stimulus to labor demand,
or whether local stimulus is diluted across space through a chain reaction of
local spillovers. To answer this question we introduce a labor demand shock
in a high-unemployment neighborhood, and use model predictions to simulate
its local and surrounding eﬀects.
As an example, we consider an increase in the number of job openings in
Stratford, a high-unemployment area in East London,15 which was the main
15In February 2005, Stratford had a ratio of claimant unemployment to resident population
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venue of the 2012 Olympic Games. The Olympics led to both a large tempo-
rary increase in construction-related projects, and to a permanent expansion
in the local retail sector, with the opening of the Westfield Stratford City
shopping mall next to the Olympic Park in September 2011. In what follows
we simulate the impact of a doubling in the number of vacancies in Stratford
and New Town Ward in a given month, from 464 to 928. In the simulation we
impose constant returns to scale, an assumption which is not rejected by our
estimates. The rationale for this choice is to make the total number of applica-
tions made by workers at all locations independent of the size of the economy,
and thus unaﬀected by the shock considered (see equation (4)). Based on the
estimates of column 2 in Table 2, the model predicts a total increase in the
vacancy outflow, and thus in the unemployment outflow, of 173. The implied
vacancy outflow rate is 37 percent, closely in line with the average vacancy
outflow rate reported in Table A1.
The spatial diﬀusion of this shock is illustrated in Table 4, showing the pre-
dicted absolute and percentage changes in the vacancy outflow ((1−−˜))
and the unemployment outflow (P ( e)) in diﬀerent rings around
Stratford, as well as the predicted percentage change in applications per job
(equation (18)). In Stratford itself the vacancy outflow rises by 178 (column
1), but the unemployment outflow hardly changes at all (column 2). The ab-
solute change in the unemployment outflow comes from a wider ring around
Stratford, with 60 percent of the increase being drawn from more than 10km
from Stratford (though only 20 percent coming from more than 20km). This
does not mean that large numbers of unemployed workers 20km from Strat-
ford are applying for the new jobs. Rather, what happens is that workers in
or very close to Stratford re-direct their search acitvity towards Stratford and
workers from slightly farther afield now apply to the jobs that receive fewer ap-
plications. The redirection of search eﬀort towards Stratford implies a decline
in the absolute vacancy outflow away from Stratford, although quantitatively
crowding out eﬀects are very modest (178.25-173.18).16
of 6%, which was nearly three times higher than the average for England and Wales.
16Tiny crowding out eﬀects also imply that welfare evaluations of job creation policies
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Turning to percentage changes in columns 3-5, as total applications in
the economy are unchanged, applications per job on average fall. In Stratford,
where vacancies double, applications per job fall by about 1.6 percent. Around
Stratford, applications per job also fall, as Stratford attracts job search from
surrounding areas. This spillover eﬀect decays with distance, and the per-
centage change in applications per job is below 1 percent beyond 10 km from
Stratford, and negligible beyond 35 km. The number of vacancies filled in
Stratford virtually doubles, meaning that all extra vacancies created are filled.
This is not surprising, given the localized shock. Again we find no evidence of
any sharp local eﬀect on the unemployment outflow, which is rising locally by
only 0.6 percent. If anything, the unemployment outflow within 10 km rises
slightly more than in Stratford,17 and beyond this cutoﬀ distance its change
becomes negligible. As the total number of vacancies and unemployed increase
with the square of the distance from Stratford, percentage changes in either
outflow decline more sharply with distance than absolute changes.
The geographic diﬀusion of this shock is shown graphically in Figure 2, in
which wards around Stratford are shaded according to the average percentage
change in the unemployment outflow. As the impact on vacancy and unem-
ployment outflows is very modest, we would also expect this policy to have
limited eﬀects on vacancy creation and residential mobility. While the location
of vacancies and the unemployed is exogenous in our model, these predictions
imply that incentives to relocate following local stimulus are small.
The main implication of our result is that, while labor markets are quite
local, in the sense that the attractiveness of job oﬀers strongly declines with
distance, their overlapping structure means that local shocks generate wide
ripple eﬀects. Even strong local stimulus has a limited eﬀect on the local
whose scope is small relative to the aﬀected area may not need to take into account such
search externalities.
17This non-monotonicity comes from the fact that the∙P
0 0
³
1−−˜0
˜0
´ 0−∗0¸−1 term, capturing the extent of job competition,
falls more in Stratford than elsewhere. This term determines the number of applications
sent from each area  to each area , according to (5), and thus the unemployment outflow
in each area , according to (22).
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exit rate from unemployment, because a series of spatial spillovers dissipates
a local shock across overlapping labor markets. In the example considered,
unemployed workers living relatively close to Stratford divert some of their
job search eﬀort from their local wards towards Stratford. This reduces job
competition in their local wards and attracts applications from slightly further
afield, and so on. The model thus explains the spatial propagation of local
shocks even in the presence of relatively high costs of distance. As a corollary,
one can imagine that a local employment stimulus is likely to have sizeable
eﬀects on local unemployment if there is a “firebreak” across which few workers
commute, as the firebreak prevents local stimulus to dissipate via ripple eﬀects.
Thus stimuli in more isolated areas are expected to have larger local eﬀects,
in line with findings by Briant, Lafourcade and Schmutz (2015).18
We next compare predictions from our simulation to actual data on job
postings and the unemployment outflow around Stratford in the run-up to the
2012 Olympics. Much of the increase in labor demand took place in summer
2012 with running the Olympics itself, while some has built up steadily over
time (e.g. in construction and retail). Panel A in Figure 3 presents time series
for new vacancies advertised in Stratford, in wards within 3km of Stratford,
and in London, all normalized to their January 2009 values.19 There is a steady
increase in job openings in Stratford since the early months of 2011, with a
peak in summer 2011, associated with the opening of the Westfield Stratford
City mall, and another even larger peak in spring 2012 in anticipation of the
Games, with vacancy inflows running at about ten times their usual level.
Other areas show no such trend. Panel B plots series for the unemployment
18From the above discussion it follows that the spatial dilution of local stimulus could
also be contained by subsidies to the employment of residents of targeted areas. While
ripple eﬀects are strong enough to dilute the eﬀect of local stimulus across surrounding
areas, hiring subsidies for local residents are more eﬀective in raising the local exit rate
from unemployment, as they impose a discontinuity in the ripple eﬀect to the advantage
of those living inside the targeted area. The intervention considered in this case is more
“people-based” than “place-based” and suggests that one can benefit residents of targeted
areas by increasing their eﬀectiveness in the competition for jobs.
19While information on the stock of vacancies in the NOMIS is not comparable before and
after May 2006 (see footnote 3), the procedure for registering the inflow of newly advertised
vacancies remains unchanged.
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outflow in the same areas as in Panel A, and shows little or no evidence of an
increase in outflows in Stratford or surrounding areas as a result of the spike
in vacancies. While this simple exercise cannot provide an exhaustive analysis
of the local employment eﬀects of the 2012 Olympics and associated projects,
these indications are in line with our model predictions and are consistent with
negligible local eﬀects of targeted labor demand stimulus.
Our approach has important implications for the evaluation of place-based
policies. For policy evaluation one should ideally define treatment and control
areas such that the whole policy impact is confined within the treatment area,
while ensuring that treatment and control areas are otherwise similar. The
results reported above imply that it is not feasible to cut up the country into
non-overlapping areas which satisfy these criteria if the location and nature of
shocks are ex ante unknown.
However, the location of intervention is often known ex-ante, in which case
a “bespoke” treatment area can be defined. But ripple mechanisms imply that
this may be hard to achieve. If the treatment area is defined as a relatively
small area around the source of the shock, most of the impact will likely
happen outside it, and would possibly contaminate the control areas if those
are adjacent. The resulting estimate for the treatment eﬀect would be biased
towards zero. This problem can be avoided by defining a larger treatment
area, within which most of the policy impact is indeed confined. But this
area may be very large relative to the scale of the policy, in which case a
test based on a comparison between treatment and control outcomes would
lack statistical power. For example, in the above exercise we compute that
90 percent of the treatment is produced within 29 km from the source of the
shock, suggesting that a radius of about 30 km could define an appropriate
treatment area for the evaluation of this particular shock. But while the shock
considered is very large relative to the size of the target ward, it only represents
a 0.7 percent increase in vacancies in the suggested treatment area, making it
hard to identify significant eﬀects of intervention. These magnitudes are by
no means specific of the Stratford example above. To show this, we consider
a doubling of vacancies in each of the 8,850 wards in our sample, and obtain
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the spatial distribution of the change in the unemployment outflow. Figure
4 reports the geographic distribution of treatment, averaged across all wards,
and the 90th percentile in this distribution is roughly 31 km, thus very close
to the 90th percentile of treatment in the Stratford example.
The above definition of treatment areas requires rich information on the
distribution of unemployment and vacancies and the nature of local spillovers,
as summarized in our structural model, and a practical issue is whether more
easily available data like the distribution of commutes could help define treat-
ment areas. Indeed ripple eﬀects imply that treatment eﬀects generally extend
to distances beyond typical commutes. While the median commute is 6 km,
half of the treatment eﬀect of policy is only produced within 14 km; thus the
median treatment distance is about 2.5 times the median commute, implying
that treatment areas need to be some multiple of typical commuting distances.
B Reduction in Transportation Costs
We next assess the importance of transportation costs by simulating the eﬀect
of a sizeable reduction in the cost of distance between a high-unemployment
area and an area with relatively high supply of jobs. The idea is to evaluate
whether an improved transport link can eﬀectively reduce the degree of spatial
mismatch between workers and jobs. We pick Stratford and Heathrow as the
high- and low-unemployment areas, respectively.20 The Heathrow Villages
ward is locates in West London, and surrounds Heathrow Airport. Heathrow
and Stratford are about 30.7 km apart, or 1 hour and 20 minutes apart using
public transport, and we simulate the impact of halving such distance.
We recalculate the utility of commuting by including in the public transport
mode of the inclusive value (15) a new distance matrix in which the distance be-
tween the two wards is set at 15.35 km, and the distance between any two other
wards  and  is recalculated if either the distance −Heathrow−Stratford−
or −Stratford−Heathrow− is shorter than the original distance . This
is equivalent to introducing a fast, non-stop service between Stratford and
20In February 2005, the ratio between registered unemployment and Jobcentre vacancies
was 1.35 in Stratford and 0.17 in Heathrow.
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Heathrow, as will happen when the Crossrail project is completed in 2018,
allowing individuals near either node to re-optimize their travel schedule ac-
cordingly. As a consequence, we would expect some jobseekers in Stratford to
choose to search for jobs in Heathrow, thus raising the unemployment outflow
in Stratford, and at the same time increasing job competition and reducing
the unemployment outflow around Heathrow.
Table 5 illustrates the impact of this improved transport link at various
distances from Stratford and Heathrow, and for simplicity we only report per-
centage changes and omit absolute changes. As expected, applications per
job rise both in Heathrow and its close vicinity (column 1, rows 1 and 2), as
this location is now attracting more jobseekers from Stratford and surround-
ing areas. As a consequence, the vacancy outflow increases (column 2) and
the locals are less likely to find jobs (column 3), as they face stronger job
competition from new applicants attracted by the faster transport link. In
row 4, we find that applications per job decline only very slightly in Stratford,
with virtually no change in the vacancy outflow. The unemployment outflow
in Stratford increases, as job opportunities are easier to reach. It should be
noted that, quantitatively, the impact on the unemployment outflow is always
very small, whether positive or negative, and becomes negligible beyond 10 km
from either transport node (rows 7 and 8). Spillovers on the unemployment
outflow around Heathrow and Stratford are illustrated in more detail on a map
in Figure 5, where darker and lighter shades correspond to an increase and a
decrease, respectively, in the unemployment outflow. Overall, the impact on
the unemployment outflow is relatively modest, but it propagates quite widely
around either target.
V Conclusions
This paper has developed a model of job search across space that is empirically
tractable and allows estimation of a labor market process with a large number
of overlapping markets, avoiding drawbacks that typically arise when local la-
bor markets are modeled as non-overlapping segments of the economy. Using
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data on unemployment and vacancies to estimate a matching function at the
ward (or neighborood) level, we find that unemployed workers’ search eﬀorts
are strongly discouraged by distance to target jobs. Our estimates imply that
the probability that a random job 5 km distant is preferred to a local ran-
dom job is only 19 percent. Also, workers are significantly discouraged from
applying to jobs in areas in which they expect relatively strong competition
from other jobseekers. Constant returns in matching markets are not rejected,
implying that the total number of job applications made in this economy does
not respond to the absolute size of the vacancy pool. Our estimated model,
encompassing high costs of distance, predicts actual commuting flows very
accurately.
We use our estimates to simulate the impact of local development policies
like local stimulus to labor demand or improved transportation links. Despite
the fact that labor markets are relatively local, location-based policies turn
out to be rather ineﬀective in raising the local unemployment outflow, because
labor markets overlap and the associated ripple eﬀects in applications largely
dilute the eﬀect of local shocks across space. This has important implications
for the evaluation of place-based policies. Defining small treatment areas risks
omitting most of the impact and contaminating control areas, while large
treatment areas make it more diﬃcult to identify eﬀects for policies that are
large relative to small areas but small relative to a large area in which the
treatment eﬀect is confined.
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All Figures are best viewed in color print  
 
Figure 1 
Actual and predicted commutes by distance travelled. 
 
  
Notes. The graph plots shares of commutes by 1 km bins. Actual commutes are obtained from ASHE, using information 
on postcode of residence and postcode of work of employees. Predicted commutes are computed using equation (22) 
and the estimates of column 1 in Table 2. 
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Figure 2 
Effect of a doubling in the number of vacancies in Stratford  
on the unemployment outflow (percentage change). 
 
  
Notes. The predicted unemployment outflow by ward is given by ܷ௔ ∑ ௔ܰ௕ܲ൫ܣሚ௕൯௕ , where ௔ܰ௕ and ܣሚ௕ are evaluated 
using the estimates of column 2 in Table 2, for alternative values of vacancies in Stratford (464 at baseline; 928 
following the shock).  
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Figure 3 
Actual changes in the vacancy inflow (Panel A) and the unemployment outflow (Panel B) 
in and around Stratford 
 
  
Notes: All series are smoothed using moving averages with a 3-month window and equal monthly weights, and 
normalized to their January 2009 values. 
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Figure 4 
The spatial distribution of local policy impact on the unemployment outflow 
 
  
Notes. The CDF of treatment represents the percentage of the total increase in the unemployment outflow produced 
within a given distance from the source of a local labor demand shock. The underlying shock is a doubling in the number 
of local vacancies. 
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Figure 5 
The effect of halving the cost of distance between Heathrow and Stratford  
on the unemployment outflow (percentage change). 
 
 
  
Notes. The predicted change in the unemployment outflow by ward is given by ܷ௔ ∑ ௔ܰ௕ܲ൫ܣሚ௕൯௕ , where ௔ܰ௕ and ܣሚ௕are 
evaluated using the estimates of column 2 in Table 2, for alternative values of the distance between Heathrow and 
Stratford (30.7 km at baseline; 15.35 km following intervention). 
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Table 1 
Estimates of the search model 
 May 2004-April 2006 
 
The model specification is given by equations (18) and (21) for the exogenous wage case and equations (20) and (21) 
for the endogenous wage case. The reported estimates are means across the 24 months from May 2004-April 2006. The 
estimation method is nonlinear least squares. s.e.1 is the standard variation in the monthly parameter estimates. s.e.2 is 
the square root of the mean of the monthly parameter variances, obtained from the non-linear least squares procedure, 
adjusted for heteroscedasticity and possible spatial autocorrelation. Parameters ߩ and ܿ̃ refer to the exogenous wage 
model, and parameters ߩଵ and ܿ̆ refer to the endogenous wage model.  
 
  
  Exogenous wage model  Endogenous wage model 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Parameters  mean s.e.1 s.e.2  mean s.e.1 s.e.2 
Cost of distance (ߜ∗)  0.220 0.026 0.059  0.360 0.089 0.152 
Returns to scale (ߛ)  -0.160 0.038 0.092  0.015 0.039 0.069 
Wage elasticity (ߩ or ߩଵ)  0.920 0.373 0.444  1.727 0.638 0.686 
Matching effectiveness (λ)  0.371 0.033 0.024  0.367 0.033 0.024 
Scale parameter in ܣሚ (ܿ̃ or ܿ̌)  1.185 0.207 0.382  0.902 0.357 0.397 
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Table 2  
Estimates of a job application and matching model 
Alternative specifications for February 2005 
 
Notes. The dependent variable is the vacancy outflow rate in ward ܾ, ܯ௕/ ௕ܸ, where ܯ௕ denotes the vacancy outflow during February 2005, and ௕ܸ denotes the time-aggregate stock of vacancies during the same month. The model specification is given by equations (18) and (21). The estimation method is nonlinear least squares. Sandwich standard 
errors corrected for heteroskedasticity and spatial correlation are reported in brackets.  
 
  
 Dependent variable: vacancy outflow rate 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Cost of distance (ߜ∗) 0.200*** 0.216*** 0.189*** 0.198***  
 (0.054) (0.058) (0.058) (0.055)  
Returns to scale (ߛ) -0.116  -0.136*** -0.113  
 (0.090)  (0.024) (0.094)  
Wage elasticity (ߩ)  0.821** 0.954*** 0.836 0.850**  
 (0.438) (0.395) (0.914) (0.433)  
Matching effectiveness (λ) 0.386*** 0.384*** 0.391*** 0.387*** 0.444*** 
 (0.025) (0.023) (0.032) (0.024) (0.026) 
Scale parameter in ܣሚ (ܿ̃ሻ 1.002*** 0.543*** 1.068*** 0.987***  
 (0.336) (0.103) (0.257) (0.355)  
Local ܷ௕/ ௕ܸ (ߙଵ)   0.090   
   (0.142)   
Mismatch (ߙଶ)    0.218  
    (0.777)  
Observations 8709 8709 8709 8709 8709 
Sum of squared residuals 343.3 344.0 340.3 343.2 438.7 
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Table 3 
Job applications and wages 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes. The dependent variable is the log hourly wage. Productivity and applications per job are ward-level 
averages. Productivity is proxied by the wage prediction based on the local industry structure. Applications are 
obtained using equation (18) and the estimates of column 1 in Table 2. Other controls: year dummies (column 1); 
plus age dummies (16-65), interacted with gender, and nine region dummies (column 2); plus 3-digit occupation 
dummies (column 3). Standard errors are clustered at the ward level. Sample period: 2003-2008. 
 
  
 (1) (2) (3) 
Log productivity 1.346*** 1.069***  
 (0.042) (0.034)  
Log applications per job 0.088*** -0.017***  
 (0.009) (0.005)  
Other Controls Year Column (1) 
plus gender×age 
interactions      
and region 
Column (2) 
plus occupation  
Observations 819,771 819,771  
R2 0.096 0.253  
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Table 4  
The propagation of local shocks 
 
 Absolute change Percentage change 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Distance from 
Stratford 
Vacancy 
outflow 
Unemployment 
outflow Applications per job 
Vacancy 
outflow 
Unemployment 
outflow 
Stratford 178.25 0.42 -1.64 99.99 0.58 
(0,5] km 0.00 19.25 -1.48 -0.00 0.72 
(5,10] km -0.03 49.98 -1.33 -0.00 0.73 
(10,20] km -0.44 65.58 -0.75 -0.00 0.55 
(20,35] km -2.36 28.58 -0.36 -0.02 0.28 
(35,50] km -1.88 7.07 -0.08 -0.02 0.08 
50+ km -0.34 2.30 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 
Total 173.18 173.18    
 
Notes: The Table shows the simulated effect of a doubling in the number of vacancies in Stratford and New Town 
Ward. Applications per job are given by equation (18). The vacancy outflow is given by ߣ൫1 െ exp൫ܣሚ௕൯൯ ௕ܸ. The 
predicted unemployment outflow is given by ܷ௔ ∑ ௔ܰ௕ܲ൫ܣሚ௕൯௕ . All magnitudes are evaluated using the estimates 
of column 2 in Table 2, for alternative values of vacancies in Stratford (464 at baseline; 928 following 
intervention).  
 
 
Table 5 
The effect of reducing the cost of distance  
 
 Percentage change 
 1 2 3 
Distance Applications per job 
Vacancy 
outflow 
Unemployment 
outflow 
Heathrow 1.10 0.04 -0.57 
(0,5] km from Heathrow 0.33 0.01 -0.04 
(5,10] from Heathrow 0.17 0.01 -0.25 
Stratford -0.07 -0.00 0.61 
(0,5] km from Stratford -0.07 -0.00 0.28 
(5,10] from Stratford -0.05 -0.00 0.09 
(10,40] from both -0.01 0.01 -0.02 
40+ km from both -0.00 0.00 -0.00 
 
Notes: The Table shows the simulated effect of a halving the distance between a high-unemployment area 
(Stratford) and a low-unemployment area (Heathrow). Applications per job are given by equation (18). The 
vacancy outflow is given by ߣ൫1 െ exp൫ܣሚ௕൯൯ ௕ܸ. The predicted unemployment outflow is given by 
ܷ௔ ∑ ௔ܰ௕ܲ൫ܣሚ௕൯௕ . All magnitudes are evaluated using the estimates of column 2 in Table 2, for alternative values 
of the distance between Heathrow and Stratford (30.7 km at baseline; 15.35 km following intervention).  
Appendices
For online publication
A Data coverage
By covering unemployment and vacancies from the UK Public Employment
Service (PES), our data may not fully represent jobseekers and vacancies in
the economy. On the worker side, not all jobseekers are claimant unemployed,
as jobseekers may also be employed, or unemployed but not claiming benefits;
and not all the claimant unemployed may be jobseekers (though they are
meant to be, according to the rules for benefit entitlement). To form an idea
of data coverage, we turn to the UK Labor Force Survey (LFS), which asks a
direct question about job search both of those who are currently in and out of
employment. In the Spring of 2005 (to give one example), according to the LFS
there were about 3.1 million jobseekers in the UK, and total employment was
about 28.1 million. Almost exactly half of the jobseekers were not currently
employed, and at that time the oﬃcial figure for the claimant count was about
875,000. In the LFS, approximately 20% of the claimant unemployed do not
report looking for work in the past 4 weeks, suggesting that the claimant
unemployed represent nearly a quarter of total jobseekers in the economy.
It may be argued that the claimants are among the most intensive jobseek-
ers (see, among others, Flinn and Heckman, 1983, Jones and Riddell, 1999),
and thus we weight jobseeker figures in the LFS by the number of reported
search methods used. During the 2002-2007 period,1 the unweighted share of
claimants in total jobseekers was 17.6%, while the weighted share was 23.7%.
The share of claimants in jobseekers also varies markedly with levels of educa-
tion, being 15% among college graduates, 21.8% among high school graduates,
24.9% among those who left school at 16, and 35.2% among those with no
qualifications. This means that our study is relatively more representative of
1We need to expand the sample period here in order to improve precision of the statistics
reported.
1
low-skill labor markets, which tend to be more local.
For our purpose it is also important to know the fraction of jobseekers who
are looking at the vacancies recorded in our data, i.e. vacancies advertised
at PES Jobcentres. According to information on job-search methods used,
during 2002-2007, 92% of claimants use Jobcentres, and 45.2% of them report
Jobcentres as their most important job search method. These proportions
fall to 44.4% and 18.3% for the non-claimant unemployed, and to 19.1% and
5.9% respectively for the employed. Thus, Jobcentres are widely used by the
jobseekers in our sample. In this regard, it should be noted that the UK PES
is much more widely used than the US equivalent. Manning (2003, Table 10.5)
shows that only 22% of the US unemployed report using the PES compared
to 75% of the UK unemployed, and OECD (2000, Table 4.2) shows that the
market share of the PES in the US in vacancy coverage and total hires is
substantially lower than in the UK. Hence the UK PES does play an important
role in matching jobseekers and vacancies.
On the job vacancy side, to assess the representativeness of Jobcentre data
we use information from the Vacancy Survey of the Oﬃce for National Statis-
tics, which provides comprehensive estimates of the number of job vacancies
in the UK, obtained from a sample of about 6,000 employers every month.
Employers are asked how many job vacancies there are in their business, for
which they are actively seeking recruits from outside the business. These va-
cancy data cover all sectors of the economy except agriculture, forestry and
fishing, but are not disaggregated at the occupation or area level, so we can
only make aggregate comparisons between ONS and Jobcentre vacancy series.
On average, since April 2004, the Jobcentre vacancy series in the UK is
about two thirds the ONS series, but there are reasons to believe that such
proportion may be overstated (Machin, 2001). In particular, in May 2002, an
extra question was added to the ONS Vacancy Survey, on whether vacancies
reported had also been notified at Jobcentres, and based on this information
the ratio of total vacancies advertised at Jobcentres was 44%. While one should
allow for sampling variation (this information is only available for May 2002,
and for only 420 respondents), this 44% proportion is markedly lower that the
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two thirds recorded for the post-2004 period. According to Machin (2001), the
main reason for this discrepancy is that Jobcentre vacancies obtained from the
computerized system may include vacancies which are “awaiting follow-up”,
but which have already been filled by employers, or which have been suspended
by the Jobcentres, as it appears that suﬃcient potential recruits have already
been referred. Our vacancy series obtained from Jobcentres (“live unfilled va-
cancies”) excludes suspended vacancies, but “may still include some vacancies
which have already been filled or are otherwise no longer open to recruits, due
to natural lags in procedures for following up vacancies with employers”,2 thus
one can still imagine that two-thirds is indeed an upper bound for the fraction
of job openings that are eﬀectively available to jobseekers at Jobcentres. As
no occupation breakdown is available for the ONS vacancy series, it is not
possible to determine how the skill distribution of our vacancy data compares
to that of the whole economy, but it is plausible that Jobcentre vacancies
over-represent less-skilled jobs.
B Proof of contraction mappings
B.1 Exogenous Wage Model
To prove that (8) is a contraction mapping, we use Blackwell’s suﬃcient con-
ditions of monotonicity and discounting (Stokey and Lucas, 1989, p. 54). (8)
is a function that maps one set of applications into another set, and is a valid
mapping for all vectors in the positive orthant. We rewrite it in log form:
 () = ln = 1
1 + 
⎧
⎨
⎩ lnΨ (
) + ln
⎡
⎣X


"X
0
000
µΨ (0)
0
¶#−1⎤
⎦
⎫
⎬
⎭
=
1
1 + 
(
 lnΨ () + ln
"X

 ()−1
#)

2https://www.nomisweb.co.uk/articles/showArticle.asp?title=strongwarning: limi-
tations of data/strong&article=ref/vacs/warning-unfilled.htm
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where  == 0−c  and
 () =
"X
0
000
µΨ ()

¶#

This clearly satisfies monotonicity. As we assume 0()  0 Ψ0()  0, and
 () = Ψ() we must have Ψ () ≡  logΨ() log  1. If 0 ≤ min ≤ Ψ ≤
max ≤ 1, we have that:
 (+ ) ≥  () −(1−min)
which implies:"X

 (+ )−1
#
≤ −(−1)(1−min)
"X

 ()−1
#

This in turn implies
 ( + )−  () ≤  
1 +  [max + (1− ) (1− min)] 
For our parameter values, this satisfies discounting.
B.2 Endogenous Wage Model
To prove that (20) is a contraction mapping, note first that it satisfies monotonic-
ity because both its right- and left-hand sides are increasing in applications.
To prove discounting, define ( e) to be the log of the right-hand side of
(20), i.e.:
( e) = ln³ef  ´+ ln
⎛
⎝X


"X
0
0−˜0f 0 0
#−1⎞
⎠ 
which implies:
( e+ ) = ( e) +  (1− )
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Consider the left-hand side of (20), which can be written as:
ln ( ) +  = 
This can be thought of as giving a mapping  () where:
 0 () =  ()
1 +  () 
From the mean value theorem we have that:

³

³ e+ ´´ =  ³ ³ e´´+  0 ³e´h ³ e+ ´−  ³ e´i
= 
³

³ e´´+  0 ³e´  (1− )
= 
³

³ e´´+ (1− ) 
³e´
1 + 
³e´   
which satisfies discounting.
C Standard Errors
This section outlines in more detail the two methods we use to compute the
standard errors. The first measure (s.e.1) is obtained as the standard de-
viation of the monthly parameter estimates. Assuming that parameters are
stable across months is a necessary condition for this procedure to be valid.
If the data used are serially correlated, one might expect that the parameter
estimates themselves may be serially correlated, and that their standard errors
need to be adjusted for this fact. However Table A6 shows that the serial corre-
lation (of first and second order) in the estimates is small and never significant
so the reported standard errors are nor adjusted for serial correlation.
The second measure of standard errors (s.e.2) reports the “sandwich” stan-
dard error obtained from the non-linear least squares estimator, allowing for
possible heteroskedasticity and spatial correlation in the residuals, but assum-
5
ing that the true covariance between residuals from areas more than 100 km
apart is zero. Our estimated variance-covariance matrix of the parameters is
given by b = b−1( b0bΩ b) b−1, where b is the Hessian of the objective func-
tion, b is the Jacobian, and the spatial correlation matrix bΩ is the product
matrix of the residuals after imposing the restriction that residuals from areas
more than 100 km apart are uncorrelated.
D Descriptive data analysis and link to struc-
tural parameter estimates
This Appendix complements our model estimates of Section 4 by highlighting
the role of various aspects of the data in explaining specific structural para-
meters. We process in three steps. First, we provide descriptive evidence on
local matching patterns by estimating a conventional, reduced-form, matching
function, augmented for local spillovers. Second, we obtain a restricted version
of our structural model, which delivers a closed-form solution for the outflow
rate and thus a clearer correspondence between data and model parameters.
Third, we link monthly variation in our structural parameter estimates to
monthly variation in the reduced-form matching function estimates, in the
spirit of Gentzkow and Shapiro (2017).
D.1 Regression Models for the Vacancy Outflow Rate
In our reduced-form matching function specification, we regress the vacancy
outflow rate in a ward on the stocks of unemployment and vacancies in both
the local and surrounding wards, treated as exogenous.3
3Existing evidence on residential migration of the unemployment is clearly in line with
our assumption of exogenous jobseekers’ location. Gregg, Machin and Manning (2004) show
that the unemployed in the UK rarely migrate in search of better job opportunities, and
evidence suggests that those who both find a job and move location in a given year typically
find a job first and then seek to move home if the commute from their current location is
too inconvenient (Gregg, Machin and Manning, 2004, pp. 387-395).
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Geographic spillovers are captured in the following regression equation:
log
µ

¶
= 0 + 1 log( + 15 + 210 + 320 + 435) (D1)
+2 log( + 15 + 210 + 320 + 435) + 3 log + 
where  is the vacancy outflow in ward  at time ,  is the number of
unemployed in ward , 5 is the number of unemployed in wards within
5km of  (excluding  itself), 10 is the number of unemployed in wards
between 5 km and 10 km of ward , and so on; and similarly for vacancies.
 denotes ward-level wages relative to mean wages within 10 km, and only
varies across wards. This specification implies that the probability of filling
a vacancy in  depends on local unemployment and on unemployment in the
surrounding areas, whereby   1 would imply that more distant unemployed
workers are less eﬀective in filling a vacancy in  than local workers. Similarly,
more vacancies in  and neighboring wards are expected to reduce the vacancy
outflow rate in , whereby   1 implies that more distant vacancies have
a diminishing eﬀect. Specifications similar to (D1) have been estimated by
Burda and Profit (1996) for Czech districts, and Burgess and Profit (2001)
and Patacchini and Zenou (2007) for UK TTWAs.
We next define the total number of unemployed and vacancies within 10km
of : e10 =  + 5 + 10; e10 =  + 5 + 10
and approximate (D1) by:
log
µ

¶
≈ 0 + 1 log e10 + 2 log e10
+1
Ã
1− 2
2
e10 + 1 − 22 5e10 + 3 − 22 20e10 + 4 − 22 35e10
!
+2
Ã
1− 2
2
e10 + 1 − 22 5e10 + 3 − 22 20e10 + 4 − 22 35e10
!
+3 log +  (D2)
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Specification (D2) has the advantage of being linear in parameters, so in-
strumental variables and ward fixed-eﬀects can be easily introduced. Returns
to scale in the matching function can be assessed by comparing coeﬃcients
on log e10 and log e10, while coeﬃcients on share variables e10,...,
35e10, and e10,..., 35e10 indicate the relative eﬀectiveness of
unemployment and vacancies at diﬀerent distances. The decision to normalize
by unemployment and vacancies within 10 km in (D2) is arbitrary, but it is
important to choose a normalization for which  and  are not zero, and for
which the share variables are not too large. Considering this, 10 km seemed
the right choice. On average, about 5% of unemployment and vacancies within
10 km are in the local ward, one-third are within 5 km. Moving beyond the 10
km ring, there are about 4.5 times the number of unemployed and vacancies
between 10 and 20 km as within 10 km and 16 times as many within 35 km.
Estimates of specification (D2) are reported in Table A7. Column 1 pools
all months and wards without time or ward eﬀects. The estimates are in
line with the typical matching function results in which the probability of
filling any given vacancy rises with the number of unemployed and falls with
the number of vacancies. The coeﬃcients on the unemployment and vacancy
variables imply a returns-to-scale parameter of 0.977 (= 1 + 0201 − 0224),
suggesting (something very close to) constant returns. It is not just the level
of unemployment and vacancies within 10 km that aﬀect the outflow rate but
also their geographical mix. As expected, the closer the unemployed to a
ward, the higher the local vacancy matching rate. From the coeﬃcients on
e10 and 5e10 one can derive an estimate for 2 of 0.22 and for 1
of 0.53, i.e. unemployed workers outside the ward but within 5 km have 53% of
the matching eﬀectiveness as those within the ward and the unemployed in the
5-10km ring have an eﬀectiveness of 22%. Unemployed in the 20 km and 35 km
rings have tiny eﬀects on the vacancy outflow, but statistically diﬀerent from
zero. For vacancies, the closer they are, the lower the local outflow rate, as jobs
at shorter distances are are closer substitutes to local ones. Vacancies within
5 km have 23% of the eﬀectiveness of those within the ward, and vacancies
in the 5-10 km ring have an eﬀectiveness of 21%. Vacancies in the 20 km
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and 35 km rings have very small eﬀects on the vacancy outflow rate. Column
2 introduces time dummies, with a very slight attenuation of all coeﬃcients,
but virtually identical conclusions. In both columns the coeﬃcient on relative
wages is positive and highly significant.
While this is the standard approach in the empirical matching function lit-
erature, there are concerns on the identification of the parameters of interest.
For example, innovations in matching eﬃciency in an area, as represented by
, may aﬀect worker location and job creation, leading to an upward bias
on the coeﬃcients on both unemployment and vacancies. Furthermore, as the
dependent variable is obtained by dividing the vacancy outflow by the local
stock, which also appears in the construction of some of the right-hand side
variables, a division bias issue may occur if the vacancy stock is measured with
error. Column 3 thus instruments all vacancy and unemployment variables us-
ing the one-month lags in the corresponding inflows. The coeﬃcients on the
unemployment variables, as expected, are now lower — specifically the coeﬃ-
cient on log e10 is only slightly lower, while the one on e10 is markedly
lower — while the coeﬃcients on vacancy variables are higher, consistent with
a division bias, rather than an endogeneity bias. And indeed the coeﬃcient
which is mostly aﬀected is the one on e10, on which the local vacancy
stock has the most influence. Overall, our previous qualitative conclusions on
matching elasticities 1 and 2, as well as on the decay of spillover eﬀects with
distance, are robust to the introduction of instrumental variables. Column
4 introduces ward fixed eﬀects and the most noticeable change is a marked
increase in standard errors on all coeﬃcients, as within-ward variation in un-
employment and vacancy variables is smaller than the cross-section variation.
This is especially true for unemployment variables, as within ward variation in
(log) unemployment explains less than 3% of the total variance, while for (log)
vacancies the within-ward variation explains 12% of the total variance. The
matching elasticities 1 and 2 remain firmly significant, but the spatial dis-
tribution of spillovers is no longer precisely identified. This implies that most
of the useful variation in investigating spatial matching is cross-sectional. Col-
umn 5 includes region fixed eﬀects, as opposed to ward fixed eﬀects, and the
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resulting magnitude and significance of local spillovers are virtually unchanged
from column 3, which does not include any geographic eﬀects.
The dependent variable in specification (D2) is not defined when the out-
flow rate is zero. This becomes a relevant issue when using data on very small
areas, and indeed the vacancy outflow is zero in 6.2% of observations in our
sample. To deal with this we estimate outflow equations like (D2) in levels
instead of logs.
Column 1 in Table A8 presents estimates of a log-linear matching function,
having excluded unemployment and vacancies beyond 10km, as the estimates
in Table A7 suggest that their impact is negligible. Column 2 estimates the
level version of this equation by non-linear least squares, excluding observa-
tions with zero vacancy outflow, thus on the same sample as in column 1. The
estimates are qualitatively similar, with a considerable reduction in the size of
the coeﬃcients on all ratio variables. Column 3 estimates the levels model but
includes the “zeroes”, i.e. the estimation method is the same as in column 2,
but with a larger sample size. The estimates obtained are very close to those
reported in column 2. Columns 4 and 5 report results for the log-linear and
linear models estimated for one month only (February 2005), as done for some
of the estimates of Section 4.
The results of Tables A7 and A8 are consistent with a simple matching
model with spatial spillovers. However, these specifications have limitations
for making inference about the size of local labor markets, as they are not
informative about the reasons for the spillovers. In other words, the estimated
eﬀect of the number of unemployed 10 km away on the probability of filling va-
cancies in  may result from both those workers directly applying to vacancies
in , and from them applying for vacancies more local to them, say 5 km away,
which then become harder to obtain, and causing workers 5 km away from 
to shift their search eﬀorts towards vacancies in . These two scenarios, while
observationally equivalent in reduced-form estimates, have diﬀerent implica-
tion for the size of local labor markets and the evaluation of local intervention.
Our structural model provides insight into the structure of local spillovers.
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D.2 The Model: A Special Case
One feature of our structural model that makes it hard to visualize the link
between parameter estimates and specific data features is the absence of a
closed-form solution. In this subsection we consider a special case which in-
stead delivers a closed-form solution and thus a clearer correspondence between
data and model parameters.
Let’s consider the model for job applications in (18), and impose that
unemployment, vacancies and wages are equal across areas. Define  =P
 −∗  and assume that this is constant for all  i.e. that  = 
. This amounts to the assumption that every areas is as well-connected as
any other which would be the case if areas were regularly spaced on a sphere.
Under these assumptions, vacancies in all areas receive the same number of
applications. Using (18), this is given by:
˜ = ec 1−˜ h −˜c 1i−1 
which can be re-arranged to give:
˜˜ = ec 1 µ
¶
  (D3)
Equation (D3) states that applications rise with the U-V ratio. Conditional
on the U-V ratio, the eﬀect of the number of vacancies depends on the returns
to scale in matching (), and is positive, zero or negative in case of increasing,
constant or decreasing returns, respectively; and similarly for the impact of
wages on applications. One can derive a similar expression if one assume that
the cost of travelling between wards is infinitely high and all individuals live
and work in the same ward and the cost of within-ward travel is zero - in this
case one would have  = 1.4
The number of applications is unobserved, but is linked to the vacancy
4If, however, wages vary across areas, areas with higher wages attract more applications
even under constant returns.
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outflow rate through (17), which can be rewritten in log-linear form:
ln

 = ln+ ln
³
1− −˜
´
 (D4)
Using (D3) and (D4), we obtain the partial eﬀects of the U-V ratio and the
number of vacancies on the vacancy outflow rate:
 ln( )
 ln( ) =
˜−˜
1− −˜
1
1 + ˜ (D5)
 ln( )
 ln = 
 ln( )
 ln( )  (D6)
We next show evidence on these model predictions.
D.3 Linking Structural and Non-Structural Parameter
Estimates
This section aims to provide a mapping from the data to the parameters
of interest following the approach of Gentzkow and Shapiro (2017). We do
so by linking our structural parameter estimates to regression coeﬃcients
from reduced-form regressions, which have a clear partial-eﬀect interpreta-
tion. Specifically, we estimate for each month in the sample a slightly modified
version of the linear regression model (D2):
log
µ

¶
= 0 + 1 log
e10e10 + 2 log e10 + 3
Ã
e10 − e10
!
+4
Ã
5e10 − 5e10
!
+ 5 log +  (D7)
in which we have dropped unemployment and vacancies beyond 10 km and
imposed equal coeﬃcients on e10 (respectively 5e10) and e10
(respectively 5e10). We also use structural parameter estimates for each
month (whose averages across months are reported in Table 1). Thus we
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are left with 24 monthly estimates of reduced-form parameters 0,...,5, and
24 monthly estimates of structural parameters ∗ , , , , e, and regress
each of the structural parameters (or some combination of them) on 0,...,5
The results of this exercise are reported in Table A9, and summarized in the
following points:
• Elasticity of the outflow rate to the U-V ratio: ˜−˜
1−−˜
1
1+˜ . According to
(D5), the log linear regression coeﬃcient on the U-V ratio (1) should
be related to the number of applicants per vacancy. Column 1 in Table
A8 explores this prediction by regressing the right-hand side of (D5) — as
predicted by structural estimates5 — on 0,...,5. Variation in dependent
variable loads most heavily on 1, implying that job applications are
closely linked to the elasticity of the outflow rate with respect to the
U-V ratio, as predicted by (D5).
• Returns to scale parameter : . According to (D6),  should be neg-
atively related to the coeﬃcient on the U-V ratio (1) and positively
related to the coeﬃcient on vacancies (2). These correlation patterns
are validated by results of column 2, although 3 also has a significant
impact on . A plausible reason is that the unrestricted application
model is more complex than the restricted model of the previous subsec-
tion.
• Wage parameter : . Column 3 shows that this is mostly related, as it
is to be expected, to the regression coeﬃcient on wages, 5
• Scale parameter in applications: (log) . According to (D4),  plays the
role of an intercept in an outflow rate outflow, and column 4 shows that
the monthly estimate 0 is indeed the parameter that has the strongest
eﬀect on .
• Cost of distance parameter : . The role of  cannot be visualized in
the restricted model of the previous subsection, which essentially assumes
5Specifically we obtain ˜ using (18) and take averages across wards for each month.
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distance away, but — intuitively — it should be influenced by the relative
importance of near and distant unemployment and vacancies in predict-
ing vacancy outflows. Indeed column 5 shows that  is more strongly
influenced by 3 than 4.
In summary, the correlations reported in Table A9 provide clear evidence on
identification of structural parameters of our job search model by highlighting
links with relevant features of the data.
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D.  Appendix Figures and Tables  
 
Figure A1 
Unemployment to vacancy ratios in England and Wales 
Shades correspond to quartiles. 
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Figure A2 
Scatterplot (by 100-metre bins) of postcode-based distance against ward-level distance 
 
  
Notes. Each observation refers to a 100-meter bin. Source: ASHE. 
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Table A1 
Descriptive statistics on local labor markets: Means and standard deviations 
 
Notes. The sample includes CAS 2003 wards in England and Wales. Unemployment and vacancy variables are at 
monthly frequency (May 2004-April 2006) and are obtained from NOMIS. Area measures ward size in square 
km and is obtained from the 2001 Census. Wages are predicted based on the local industry composition of 
employment, combining information on the ward-level industry composition from BRES with median hourly 
wages by industry from ASHE. Due to small sample issues, predicted wages have been averaged at the ward-
level. The overall standard deviation is across all ward-month observations. The standard deviation within ward 
is obtained after removing ward-level means. The standard deviation within month is obtained after removing 
month-level means.   
 
Table A2 
Descriptive statistics on local labor markets: Correlation Matrices 
 
 
(A) Raw correlation matrix 
 
 
(B) Correlation matrix after removing ward-level means 
 
Notes. See notes to Table A1. 
Variable Mean 
Standard deviation 
No. Obs. Overall Within  ward 
Within 
month 
Unemployment stock 106.5 147.8 14.9 147.7 208,762 
Vacancy stock 91.9 228.3 61.3 228.0 208,762 
Vacancy outflow 29.1 73.5 33.0 73.4 208,762 
Vacancy Outflow Rate 0.331 0.201 0.184 0.198 208,762 
U-V Ratio 3.69 8.03 5.23 8.00 208,762 
Area 17.0 28.3 - - 8,850 
Wages 9.08 0.90 - - 8,850 
 Unemploym. Vacancies Vacancy outflow 
Vacancy 
outflow Rate U-V Ratio 
Unemployment 1     
Vacancies 0.366 1    
Vacancy outflow 0.374 0.913 1   
Vacancy Outflow Rate 0.083 -0.028 0.114 1  
U-V Ratio 0.189 -0.127 -0.118 0.115 1 
 Unemploym. Vacancies Vacancy outflow 
Vacancy 
outflow Rate U-V Ratio 
Unemployment 1     
Vacancies -0.144 1    
Vacancy outflow -0.036 0.626 1   
Vacancy Outflow Rate 0.055 -0.004 0.260 1  
U-V Ratio 0.106 -0.069 -0.047 0.007 1 
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Table A3 
Conditional logit estimates for the choice of transport mode 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes. The coefficients reported are obtained from a conditional logit model where the omitted (base) category is 
driving. The number of observations is 8.5 million. Source: 2001 Census Special Workplace Statistics.   
 
 
Table A4 
Estimates of a job application and matching model 
Sample averages for May 2004-April 2005 
 
Notes. Model specifications are the same as in Table 2. Coefficients reported are averages across monthly 
estimates, with standard deviations reported in brackets. Specification (4) is estimated on the months February 
2005-May 2006, as unemployment data by occupation become available in January 2005. 
  
 Mode of transport 
 Walking Cycling Public Transport 
Constant -1.0563 -2.5607 -1.527 
 (0.00102) (0.00175) (0.00073) 
Distance -0.1288 -0.0787 0.0043 
 (0.00017) (0.00024) (0.00003) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Cost of distance (ߜ∗) 0.220*** 0.248*** 0.215*** 0.220***  
 (0.026) (0.034) (0.027) (0.028)  
Returns to scale (ߛ) -0.160***  -0.176*** -0.145***  
 (0.038)  (0.039) (0.033)  
Wage elasticity (ߩ)  0.920*** 1.150*** 0.942* * 1.025***  
 (0.373) (0.410) (0.378) (0.261)  
Matching effectiveness (λ) 0.371*** 0.366*** 0.371*** 0.383*** 0.425*** 
 (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.032) (0.039) 
Scale parameter in ܣሚ (ܿ̃ሻ 1.185*** 0.557*** 1.239*** 1.075***  
 (0.207) (0.083) (0.202) (0.131)  
Local ܷ௕/ ௕ܸ (ߙଵ)   0.051   
   (0.043)   
Mismatch (ߙଶ)    0.715*  
    (0.412)  
Number of months 24 24 24 15 24 
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Table A5 
Average commuting times in the UK 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes. Figures report one-way daily commuting times (in minutes). New jobs are defined by tenure up to three 
months. Source: Labour Force Survey, 1993-2007. 
 
 
Table A6 
Test for serial correlation in structural parameter estimates 
 
Notes. The estimates reported are obtained from first- and second-order autoregressive models for the monthly 
parameter estimates summarized in Table 1.   
  
  Mean Std. Dev. No. Obs. 
Not on new job 24.4 22.2 620824 
On new job, found via:    
 Reply to advert 24.5 21.6 16117 
 Job centre 24.5 20.2 4499 
 Careers office 30.2 26.1 453 
 Jobclub 25.6 25.6 61 
 Private agency 34.6 26.3 4869 
 Personal contact 23.2 23.0 15639 
 Direct application 22.4 21.7 9673 
 Some other method 27.6 26.6 5708 
Total 24.5 22.3 677843 
 Dependent variable 
 ߜ௧∗ ߛ௧ ߩ௧ λ௧ ܿ̃௧ 
1st order lag 0.115 -0.030 0.075 -0.195 0.219 
 (0.220) (0.213) (0.212) (0.269) (0.210) 
Observations 23 23 23 23 23 
1st order lag  0.166 -0.057 0.026 -0.103 0.129 
 (0.229) (0.203) (0.232) (0.287) (0.209) 
2nd order lag -0.255 0.442 -0.026 0.277 0.421* 
 (0.239) (0.200) (0.221) (0.289) (0.211) 
Observations 22 22 22 22 22 
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Table A7 
Log-linear matching functions with local spillovers 
 
 
Notes. The Table provides estimates for equation (D2). The relative wage coefficient cannot be estimated when 
ward fixed effects are included as it only varies across wards. Standard errors are clustered by ward and reported 
in brackets. Sample period: May 2004-April 2006. 
 
 
  
 Dependent variable: (log) vacancy outflow rate 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Estimation method OLS OLS IV IV IV 
 log ෩ܷଵ଴௕ 0.201*** 0.193*** 0.178*** 0.120** 0.168*** 
 (0.00440) (0.00477) (0.00612) (0.0581) (0.00459) 
 log ෨ܸଵ଴௕ -0.224*** -0.214*** -0.191*** -0.159*** -0.190*** 
 (0.00528) (0.00573) (0.00751) (0.0311) (0.00521) 
 ܷ௕/ ෩ܷଵ଴௕ 0.714*** 0.711*** 0.317*** -0.155 0.222*** 
 (0.0563) (0.0559) (0.0798) (0.415) (0.0491) 
 ܷହ௕/ ෩ܷଵ଴௕ 0.287*** 0.281*** 0.193*** 0.0764 0.196*** 
 (0.0267) (0.0267) (0.0308) (0.265) (0.0177) 
 ܷଶ଴௕/ ෩ܷଵ଴௕ -0.00135* -0.00158** -4.21e-05 -0.0103 -0.000530 
 (0.000770) (0.000755) (0.00135) (0.00982) (0.000853) 
 ܷଷହ௕/ ෩ܷଵ଴௕ 0.000262** 0.000233** 0.000683** 0.000350 0.000747*** 
 (0.000108) (0.000108) (0.000318) (0.00221) (0.000183) 
 ௕ܸ/ ෨ܸଵ଴௕ -0.852*** -0.842*** -0.164*** -0.371** -0.175*** 
 (0.0445) (0.0444) (0.0508) (0.144) (0.0308) 
 ହܸ௕/ ෨ܸଵ଴௕ -0.120*** -0.116*** -0.0588** -0.0374 -0.0530*** 
 (0.0240) (0.0240) (0.0277) (0.0882) (0.0160) 
 ଶܸ଴௕/ ෨ܸଵ଴௕ -0.000699 -0.000531 -0.00618*** -0.00559 -0.00651*** 
 (0.00106) (0.00100) (0.00153) (0.00408) (0.000971) 
 ଷܸହ௕/ ෨ܸଵ଴௕ -2.42e-05 -4.42e-06 -0.00101** -0.000399 -0.000884*** 
 (0.000121) (0.000116) (0.000434) (0.00181) (0.000279) 
logݓ௕ 0.169*** 0.168*** 0.178***  0.180*** 
 (0.0318) (0.0318) (0.0333)  (0.0158) 
Observations 197,579 197,579 175,157 175,157 175,157 
Time fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Ward fixed effects No No No Yes No 
Region fixed effects No No No No Yes 
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Table A8 
Matching functions in log and level 
 
Notes.  Columns (1) and (4) provide estimates for equation (D2). Columns (2), (3) and (5) provide estimates for 
the exponential of equation (D2). Standard errors are clustered by ward and reported in brackets. Sample: May 
2004-April 2006 in columns (1)-(3) and February 2005 in column (5).  
 
  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Estimation method OLS NLLS  NLLS  OLS  NLLS 
 log ෩ܷଵ଴௕ 0.192*** 0.178*** 0.172*** 0.191*** 0.167*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.010) (0.011) 
 log ෨ܸଵ଴௕ -0.212*** -0.220*** -0.171*** -0.205*** -0.162*** 
 (0.00510) (0.005) (0.005) (-0.012) (0.013) 
 ܷ௕/ ෩ܷଵ଴௕ 0.706*** 0.502*** 0.332*** 0.532*** 0.196 
 (0.0560) (0.050) (0.045) (0.141) (0.139) 
 ܷହ௕/ ෩ܷଵ଴௕ 0.290*** 0.203** 0.201* 0.231*** 0.149** 
 (0.0264) (0.024) (0.023) (0.065) (0.062) 
 ௕ܸ/ ෨ܸଵ଴௕ -0.843*** -1.025*** -0.429*** -0.705*** -0.365*** 
 (0.0444) (0.040) (0.035) (0.102) (0.102) 
 ହܸ௕/ ෨ܸଵ଴௕ -0.117*** -0.091 -0.031 -0.046 0.045 
 (0.0240) (0.022) (0.021) (0.060) (0.059) 
logݓ௕ 0.168*** 0.139*** 0.0.135*** 0.176** 0.073 
 (0.0319) (0.029) (0.028) (0.072) (0.069) 
Observations 197579 197579 208717 8282 8708 
Functional form Log Level Level Log Level 
Time effects Yes Yes Yes No No 
Sample Non-zero Outflow 
Non-zero 
Outflow All 
Feb 2005; 
Non-zero 
outflow 
Feb 2005; 
All 
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Table A9 
The relationship between structural parameters  
and coefficients from log-linear regression models 
 Dependent variable: Estimates from structural model 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Elasticity 
of vacancy 
outflow 
rate w.r.t 
U-V 
Returns 
to scale 
(ߛ௧) 
Coefficient 
on wages 
(ߩ௧) 
Matching 
effectiveness 
(ߣ௧) 
Cost of 
Distance 
(ߜ௧∗) 
Constant  
(	ߙ଴௧)  
-0.085 -0.116 0.006 0.997*** 0.045 
(0.068) (0.081) (0.787) (0.056) (0.062) 
Coef on logሺ ෩ܷଵ଴௕,௧/ ෨ܸଵ଴௕,௧ሻ 
(	ߙଵ௧) 
1.527*** -0.551** 1.678 0.512*** 0.200 
(0.207) (0.246) (2.389) (0.171) (0.188) 
Coef on logሺ ෨ܸଵ଴௕,௧ሻ 
(	ߙଶ௧) 
0.768 2.123** 10.200 0.116 -0.007 
(0.751) (0.894) (8.683) (0.621) (0.683) 
Coef on ൬ ௎್,೟௎෩భబ್,೟ െ
௏್,೟
௏෩భబ್,೟൰ 
(	ߙଷ௧) 
-0.042 0.100** 0.377 0.102*** 0.083** 
(0.035) (0.042) (0.406) (0.029) (0.032) 
Coef on ൬ ௎ఱ್,೟௎෩భబ್,೟ െ
௏ఱ್,೟
௏෩భబ್,೟൰ 
(	ߙସ௧) 
-0.119 -0.064 -0.861 0.031 0.033 
(0.097) (0.116) (1.123) (0.080) (0.088) 
Coef on log൫ݓ௕,௧൯ 
(	ߙସ௧) 
-0.072 0.202* 3.650*** 0.017 0.011 
     
Observations 24 24 24 24 24 
R-squared 0.820 0.548 0.563 0.959 0.445 
 
Notes. The Table reports estimates of linear regression models in which the dependent variable is the monthly 
estimate of a given parameter of the structural model (or, in the case of column (1), a function of parameters), and 
the independent variables are regression coefficients from the monthly estimates of the reduced-form model for 
the vacancy outflow rate reported in equation (D7). 
 
 
